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I. INTRODUCTION
It is obvious that Muslim liberals whose commitments are both to the
religion of Islam and to core liberal values have a problem with the codification of
the more traditionalist forms of the shari'a.1  This is particularly, but not
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Andrew F. March provides an excellent description of liberal values and the
constraints they impose on citizens of a liberal state in his own discussions of Islam and
liberalism. In his words:
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exclusively, true in the area of personal status, encompassing family law, wills,
2
and inheritance. Traditionalists working within the historic schools of Islamic
law developed rules for marriage that required a woman's sexual obedience to her
34husband, permitted a father to compel his child into marriage, and enabled a man
to unilaterally end his marriage to his wife without court involvement.5 Muslim
There is very little disagreement among liberals (or even Western
political theorists critical of liberalism) about what [liberalism] entails
and what types of practices nonliberals are expected to endorse through
their doctrines: Substate groups cannot draw on religious or cultural
authority to prevent individuals from leaving a group, cannot prevent
children from becoming aware of other forms of life in the society and
from gaining the skills to survive in it, cannot coercively impose
marital decisions on family members, cannot do certain things to their
children that are physically harmful (like female genital mutilation or
depriving children of urgent medical attention), and cannot punish
members in certain ways for dissenting from or criticizing communal
authority. Simply put, liberalism establishes a certain range of civil
rights and liberties for all citizens and does not recognize the right of
any cultural or religious authority to deprive its members of these rights
any more than it does the state....
ANDREW F. MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR AN
OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 98 (2009) (citation omitted).
March's project involves an inquiry into whether or not there is sufficiently
overlapping ground between liberalism and Islam that a Muslim committed to the more
traditional understandings of the shari'a could nevertheless find grounds in Islamic law for
a doctrine of citizenship in a non-Muslim liberal society. Id. at 102. That worthy endeavor
is distinct from the point made in this Article, which is that the codification of the
traditionalist rules of the shari'a are deeply problematic to a liberal. In other words, to
concretize the matter, there is a difference between asking whether a Muslim can support a
non-Muslim liberal state that would permit a coreligionist to leave the faith, and whether a
liberal, Muslim or otherwise, could support a law that sought to criminalize apostasy. The
former inquiry, which is March's, is quite interesting and worthy of study. As to the latter
question, as the main text notes, anyone committed to liberal values as defined above
would necessarily answer in the negative. The matter is so obvious as to be nearly
definitional.
2 See Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi
Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 731 (2004) (describing personal status as
encompassing "marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and other family-related
matters").
3 Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1063-64 (2004).
4 JUDITH TUCKER, WOMEN, FAMILY AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAw 43 (2008) ("All
legal schools agreed that a father had a right to marry [a bride in her legal minority] to
whomever he chose without consulting her; the father enjoyed similar rights to marry off
his minor sons."). This is discussed more extensively, see infra Section III.C.
Id. at 86 ("[I]n its baldest form, a man could end his marriage simply by
pronouncing a formula of divorce, after which his wife must wait a statutory period . ..
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liberals, who advocate against such rules, oppose traditionalist efforts to codify
them. In doing so, Muslim liberals articulate alternative understandings of sacred
Islamic texts that are reformist and liberal, and yet reverential of Islam and Islamic
values.6 These articulations are entirely plausible, refute Islamophobic
movements that seek to reduce Islam to a caricature, and deserve more attention
than they receive. It is also fair to note, however, that the articulated Islamic
vision seems as influenced by exogenous commitments to liberal values as it is to
Islam itself.
The same set of perceptions and assumptions respecting dual
commitments does not seem to exist with Muslim social conservatives-a term I
use to refer to those who are interested in preserving traditional hierarchies and
authorities within Islamic societies and who therefore oppose significant changes
to the existing social order. The presumption seems to be that only an
before the divorce was automatically finalized. There was no role for the court, no
possibility of contest by the wife, and only limited obligations imposed on the husband for
payment of any dower he owed and temporary support of his wife while she waited for the
divorce to be finalized.").
6 For just a short sampling of the formidable literature on this subject, see generally
FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM AND MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION OF AN INTELLECTUAL
TRADITION (1982) (articulating an ambitious reformation of Islam's intellectual traditions in
order to render them compatible with modernity); ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD
AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1st
ed. 1996) (developing a theory of sacred text that focuses less on specific rules and more on
broader principles); KECIA ALI, SEXUAL ETHICS & ISLAM: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON
QUR'AN, HADITH AND JURISPRUDENCE (2006) (offering a searching look at the extent to
which Islam may be made compatible with modern conceptions of women's rights); AMINA
WADUD, QUR'AN AND WOMAN: REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM A WOMAN'S
PERSPECTIVE (1999) (suggesting that the Qur'an, when read from a perspective other than
the traditional and patriarchal, is not as gender discriminatory as it is often perceived to be).
In the words of the respected scholar of Islam, John L. Esposito:
It is not difficult to find material that emphasizes selective analyses and
events in the Muslim world, material which is crisis oriented and
headline-driven, fueling stereotypes, fears and discrimination. Islam's
portrayal as a triple threat (political, civilizational and demographic)
has been magnified by a number of journalists and scholars who
trivialize the complexity of political, social and religious dynamics in
the Muslim world.
John L. Esposito, Foreword to NATHAN LEAN, ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY: HOW THE RIGHT
MANUFACTURES FEAR OF MUSLIMS, xi (2012).
I am less concerned in this Article about whether such social conservatives are
also political conservatives. That is to say, a Muslim social conservative may be a tribal
leader with little interest in exercising control over the state, or he or she may be a member
of an Islamist political party who explicitly seeks political power to ensure that traditional
social hierarchies are maintained. Both fit within the rubric of "social conservative" as
defined in the main text. I certainly do not use of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" to
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unshakeable commitment to traditionalist understandings of the shari'a motivates
Muslim social conservatives, as opposed to the liberal, for whom Islam and
liberalism are equally motivating. Hence, media references to "strict" Islamic law
refer to a panoply of positions that socially conservative forces within Islamic
societies advance, including the closing of movie theaters,9 the severing of hands
of businesspeople who operate without a license, 0 and even the ripping of gold
teeth from the mouths of citizens." "Literalism" has come to mean the rejection
of all Western influencesl2 and, of course, international terrorism, justified
through jihad. It should be obvious that none of the above is a "strict" or
"literal" application of religious text, but rather all are interpretations of varying
plausibility of original sources and traditional, historic commentaries. Could
anyone really believe that seventh-century sacred sources, or medieval
interpretations of them, have anything "strict" or "literal" to say about flying a
plane into a skyscraper?
Once so framed, the problem for the liberal or the reformer is rather
obvious. After all, if the conservative strictly follows the traditionalist readings of
the sacred texts verbatim, then the liberal is left working out a contextual (as
opposed to literal) and flexible (as opposed to strict) interpretation influenced by
foreign ideas. In other words, the conservative follows the Word strictly and is
"pure,"14 while the liberal manipulates it to harmonize it with other values held
dear. The liberal is therefore at a distinct disadvantage when seeking to persuade
the committed believer of the plausibility of any given liberal position in light of
its perceived contamination.
Using a particularly salient example of legislation initiated very recently,
the primary purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that it is a deep and
fundamental mistake to presume that conservative commitment is the same as
refer in any way to contemporary political disputes in the United States, which bear no
relevance here.
9 Movies, Music Banned, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 15, 1996, at A4.
to Ghaddafi Reinterprets Strict Islamic Law, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at A13.
I Somalia: Islamists Pulling Teeth from 'Sinners', OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 11,
2009, at A6.
12 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Are Salafis "Literalists "?, ISLAMIC LAW IN OUR TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2012),http://muslimlawprof.org/2012/09/are-salafists-literalists/.
13 Martin Regg Cohn, Inoculated Against Religious Radicalism; Mainstream
Disenchantment With Fundamentalism Is Clear In The World's Largest Muslim Nation,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 27, 2005, at A12.
14 "Pure" is another term used to describe Muslim social conservatives. See, e.g.,
ALI ALLAWI, THE CRISIS OF ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION 250 (2009) (describing the manner in
which Rashid Ridha turned against "reformed Islam" later in his life and opted to endorse
the "purer, Salafi variety"). Allawi does not hesitate to criticize the ultraconservative,
Salafist philosophies elsewhere in his work as hardly in keeping with Islamic intellectual
traditions. Id. at 38-39. When even a bold and iconoclastic intellectual like Allawi uses the
word "pure" to describe Salafism, juxtaposing it against Ridha's earlier reformist ideas, it is
apparent that there is something wrong with our nomenclature.
The Political Codification of Islamic Law
fealty to any pure conception of religious law. Specifically, this Article shows
that even within the area of personal status, where Muslim social conservative
commitment to shari'a is strongest, there are significant divergences between
traditionalist expectations of Muslim social conservatives and the actual rules set
forth in the doctrine. Moreover, where such divergences exist, legislative drafters
defer to the Muslim social conservative expectations at the expense of doctrine.
This is important, because it explodes the false equivalence between conservatism
and religious commitment. If Muslim social conservatives cannot remain
committed to the most traditional and historic renderings of personal status rules,
to such an extent that state law must meet their demands rather than realize
religious law, then how can anyone realistically contend that adherence to
traditional understandings of religion motivates them exclusively? In the end, is
the Muslim social conservative not engaged in the same practice as the Muslim
liberal-molding, shaping, manipulating, and ignoring various pieces and parts of
doctrine to render it compatible with a series of preexisting commitments that are
only partly religious in their origins? The result does not necessarily privilege
liberal readings over conservative ones, but at the very least it puts them on a level
playing field and permits us to see the contentions as driven more by ideological
commitment than by doctrine. In other words, the Muslim social conservative
prefers existing hierarchies and structures, and the Muslim liberal seeks to change
them. Neither of those preferences necessarily has much to do with fealty to
shari'a.
To demonstrate this point, I use the draft Ja'fari Personal Status Code of
Iraq, approved by the Iraqi cabinet in the spring of 2014 and sent to the legislature
for proposed enactment shortly thereafter.1 5 Though never made into law given
the subsequent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syrial6 as well as elections that
led to the designation of a new Prime Minister,1 7 the draft is particularly relevant
to the themes of this Article for two reasons. First, it is a result of decades-long
efforts by leaders of that part of Iraq's population who follow the Shi'i sect of
Islam' 8 to enact a Personal Status Code specific to the Shi'i community that
15 Suadad Al-Salhy, Iraqi Women Demonstrate Against Proposed Iraqi Law in
Iraq, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-iraq-women-
islam-idUSBREA270NR20140308.
16 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control of Mosul in the summer of
2014, a few months after the Ja'fari Personal Status Code was introduced. See Martin
Chulov, ISIS Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-militants-
seize-control-mosul.
Haider al-Abadi was named the Prime Minister of Iraq on August 11, 2014,
replacing Nouri al-Maliki, who had held the position previously and was quite reluctant to
give it up. Adam Taylor, Meet Haider al-Abadi, The Man Named Iraq's New Prime
Minister, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/world
views/wp/2014/08/11 /meet-haider-al-abadi-the-man-named-iraqs-new-prime-minister/.
I8 The primary difference between the Shi'a and the Sunnis concerns the
assumption of political and religious authority following the death of the Prophet
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adheres more closely to Shi'i rules than the existing Personal Status Code does.1 9
This renders adherence to traditional rules in the draft Code important. Second,
unlike their Sunni counterparts, Shi'i jurists operating in the seminaries located in
the Holy City of Najaf retain broad levels of legitimacy and authority respecting
the content of shari'a.20 This renders the traditional rules relatively easy to locate.
If there were a law, then, where one would expect very close and faithful
adherence to traditional rules, it would be in the draft of the Ja'fari Personal Status
Code. Departures from the rules should be both obvious (given how easy it is to
identify the Shi'i rules) and unjustifiable (given that the very purpose of the
project is to enable the Shi'a to live by their traditional rules).
And yet, in any number of cases, as the Article makes clear, the draft law
diverges sharply from the juristic rules clearly established in Najaf. In each case,
the divergence appears to lie in an area where the core constituency of Shi'i social
conservatives-who might be expected to support such draft legislation, and
whose electoral support the drafters were soliciting in preparing the draft had
expectations and commitments that stood in stark contrast to those of the jurists.
Thus, it is quite clear that the drafters of the Ja'fari Personal Status Code did not
make any real effort to realize some pristine form of religious doctrine. Rather,
they presented a transmogrified version designed to meet the expectations of
modem Muslim social conservatives. This does not make it per se illegitimate, to
be clear. Rather, it is no less and no more legitimate than the vision of the liberal,
whose preferences lie not in preserving traditional hierarchies and modalities of
authority, but in upending them. The point, ultimately, is that it is dangerous and
hardly conducive to religious reform within the Islamic tradition to privilege the
conservative position as being a purer form of shari'a.
Part II provides some necessary context respecting the decades-long
Islamist Shi'i demand for the repeal of the existing Iraqi Personal Status Code and
its replacement with a law that reflects the juristic rules more closely. It also
describes the specific political conditions prevailing in Iraq in the spring of 2014
that caused the draft Code to be recommended for enactment. Having provided
that context, Parts III and IV demonstrate the manner in which the draft Code
deviates from doctrine, specifically to conform to the expectations of the Muslim
social conservative constituency that was expected to support it. Part III is
devoted to the draft Code's treatment of two major, long standing aspects of Shi'i
law with deep pedigree which have proved problematic in modernity. The first is
Muhammad. The Shi'a believe that during his lifetime, the Prophet Muhammad
specifically designated his cousin and son in law Ali ibn Abi Talib as the infallible leader
of the Muslim community after his death. The Shi'a further believe that there are 12 such
infallible leaders, referred to as Imams. ROBERT GLEAVE, INEVITABLE DOUBT: Two
THEORIES OF SHI'I JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2000).
19 This is described in detail in Section IA, infra.
20 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process
and State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 523, 539
(2007) [hereinafter Hamoudi, Money Laundering].
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the favorite whipping boy of Shi'i legal doctrine: the temporary marriage. 2 1 The
second is child marriage, which is permitted across both Sunni and Shi'i
22traditional schools. The drafters all but ignored the first of these, while they not
only embraced, but indeed also expanded, the second of them far beyond
traditional and doctrinal boundaries. The only possible explanation for such an
otherwise odd result is that socially conservative forces do not engage in or
support the idea of temporary marriage, and indeed are embarrassed by its formal
legality, while many (though certainly not all) support, and in a few cases practice,
child marriage.
Part IV turns to an even starker form of deference on the part of the
drafters of the Code by showing that where the interests of socially conservative
institutions such as tribes conflicted with those of the jurists, the drafters
privileged the tribes over the jurists specifically on the determination of the
content of Islamic law. This is quite ironic given that the core objection of the
existing Personal Status Code was that it stripped the jurists of their power to
23determine Islamic law and gave it to lawmakers instead.
From the distortions of the draft Code described in Parts III and IV, the
Article then turns to juristic omissions and distortions in Part V. Part V thus
addresses other parts of historic doctrine that have proved problematic and
controversial in contemporary times, specifically slavery and female genital
mutilation. However, unlike the subjects of Parts II and III, these are areas where
jurists have themselves sought to manage the conflict between the historic rules
and the expectations of their devout and socially conservative constituencies by
omitting or distorting the historic rules, so as to avoid reciting a rule that is sure to
earn a hostile reception. In these cases, the draft Code had something of an easier
time, given that it could merely replicate the compendia of contemporary jurists
and claim faithfulness to the traditionalist rules of the Shi'a that did not in fact
exist.
In sum, this Article demonstrates that the draft Personal Status Code is
not the enactment of historic Shi'i religious doctrine so much as it is the
realization of the ideological commitments of the substantial portion of the Iraqi
Shi'i community that is socially conservative. The Article concludes by arguing
that unless the substantial, presumed equivalence between Muslim social
conservatism and Islamic law doctrine is severed, it will be nearly impossible to
free Islam from the constrictive shackles of the socially conservative
commitments with which it is currently so closely, and falsely, identified.
21 The temporary marriage is discussed in Part II.A. As for its repeated
denunciations among Sunni polemicists, see, e.g., Shaykh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid,
Mut'ah Marriage and the Refutation of Those Raafidis who Permit It, ISLAM QUESTION AND
ANSWER (Dec. 17, 2002), http://islamqa.info/en/20738 (describing the Shi'a as "following
their own whims and desires" in permitting the temporary marriage).
22 TUCKER, supra note 4, at 43.
23 This point is described in some detail in Part I.
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II. THE CURIOUS EMERGENCE OF THE DRAFT JA'FARI PERSONAL
STATUS CODE
A. Historic Shi'i Demands Respectin2 Personal Status
If there ever were a place where one would expect a modem piece of
legislation to replicate almost entirely the law of the jurists, it would lie in a draft
Personal Status Code designed for Iraq's Shi'a. The Shi'i political and religious
leaders who represented socially conservative elements of Iraqi society spent
decades calling precisely for this and for the repeal of the existing Personal Status
Code in the process. In fact, the hostility between Islamist Shi'a to the existing
24Iraqi Personal Status Code predates the enactment of that Code.
The Personal Status Code was written in 1959, intending to create a
uniform law of personal status that would apply to all Iraqis.2 5 It is therefore an
amalgam of sorts of different schools of thought within the Islamic tradition,
Sunni and Shi'i, with the drafters of the Code selecting a rule based on what
26
appealed the most to their left leaning progressive sensibilities. Hence, its rules
of inheritance drew largely on Shi'i tradition, while the rules on judicial
dissolution of marriage came from the Sunni, Maliki school of thought.2 7 Modest,
but important, reforms beyond those in the juristic manuals of any school of
thought were made as well, including most prominently the banning of child
marriages contracted by guardians.2 8
The Shi'i opposition to the law, however, ran far deeper than a mere
dispute over substance. In fact, most of the substantive objections that they have
actually articulated over the course of decades appear safely on the margins as a
practical matter. These include, for example, the fact that a Shi'i marriage does
not require two witnesses in order to be valid, and yet the Personal Status Code
24 Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal
System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 748-52 (2004).
25 Hamoudi, Money Laundering, supra note 20, at 543-46.
26 See id. at 544. The Code was enacted one year after a revolution in Iraq that
deposed the Iraqi monarchy and instituted what was called a "republic," though in point of
fact it was a dictatorship led by strongman Abdul Karim Qasim. Qasim was not a
communist, but his sympathies very much lay on the political left, and he did ally with the
communist party at various times during his short period of rule. MARION FAROUK-
SLUGLETT & PETER SLUGLETT, IRAQ SINCE 1958: FROM REVOLUTION TO DICTATORSHIP 49-
51, 58, 59 (I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2d ed. 2003).
27 See, e.g., Personal Status Law, No. 188 of 1959 (Iraq), Art. 91(2) (concerning the
inheritance of daughters), Art. 43 (concerning the right of a wife to obtain a judicial
dissolution of her marriage) (hereinafter Iraq Personal Status Code). For the Islamic
origins of these various provisions, see MARK CAMMACK & HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI,
ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN COURTS (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
28 Iraq Personal Status Code, supra note 27, arts. 8-9. See also CAMMACK &
HAMOUDI, supra note 27; Part IV.B, infra (discussing child marriage in Islamic law more
broadly).
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adopts the Sunni position that a marriage is not valid without two witnesses.
Therefore, should two people find themselves in a desert overtaken with
unquenchable sexual desire, opponents to the existing Code argued, the law would
29present them with no alternatives to fornication. The Shi'i elite, agitating for
decades against the Personal Status Code, surely do not think that this is an actual
problem that arises with any degree of frequency. Even if they do, there are
narrower ways of addressing it than repealing the entire Code.
Instead, the core objections to the Code run to the very conception of
state control over rulemaking as it concerns personal status.3 0 The idea that the
state, rather than the jurists, determine how many witnesses are needed to
conclude a marriage strikes Shi'a Islamists as offensive and requiring repeal for
no reason other than that it suggests that someone other than the jurists should be
able to determine the content of personal status rules.31  By the time of the
enactment of the Personal Status Code, the Shi'a may have long acquiesced to the
encroachment of secularized state law into the private law realm in any number of
32
areas from property, to contracts, to torts. However, the principle that personal
status needs to remain firmly Islamic, and firmly juristic, continues to hold strong.
Formally, the Shi'i Islamist demand is constant, and it is firm. The jurists, and
only the jurists, can make the law of personal status.
Hence, even as the Personal Status Code was being promulgated a half
century ago, a prominent jurist and a scion of one of Najaf's clerical families,
Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, published a widely distributed pamphlet describing the
deviations from juristic rules that were part of the Personal Status Code.
Deliberately ecumenical, Bahr al-Ulum identified deviations that would prejudice
Sunnis as much as those that would prejudice the Shi'a. Thus, for example, he
included as criticism the rule that an intoxicated man could not validly divorce his
wife under the Personal Status Code. This is a replication of a Shi'i rule, but it
diverges from the rule of the Hanafi Sunnis. Bahr al-Ulum's point was that it was
no fairer to impose Shi'i rules on Sunnis (namely, in this case, the drunk Hanafi
who wishes to divorce his wife) than it is to impose Sunni rules (for example, the
requirement of two witnesses to a marriage) on Shi'is. 3 4
The Personal Status Code was enacted in 1959 despite Bahr al-Ulum's
criticisms. The objections to the Code nevertheless continued in circulation for
some time, rising in particular with the emergence of the Shi'i Islamist "Da'wa"
movement in the 1970's that sought a form of Islamic rule in Iraq. Saddam
Hussein and his ruling, secular, Arab national Ba'ath party crushed the movement
29 Hamoudi, Money Laundering, supra note 20, at 100-01.
30 Id. at 101.
31 Id.
32 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 293,
323 (2010) (hereinafter The Death of Islamic Law).
33 Stilt, supra note 24, at 752-53.
34 See id. at 753.
35 FAROUK-SLUGLETT & SLUGLETT, supra note 26, at 196-97.
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with unspeakable repression in the 1980's, after which criticism of the Personal
36Status Code, or any element of Iraqi law or Ba'ath rule, was silenced.
Yet the issue of personal status continued to fester and in fact it emerged
soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein, at a time when full sovereignty had not
even been restored to Iraq. In December of 2003, Shi'i Islamists sought a repeal
of the Personal Status Code through the enactment of a resolution that replaced it
with nothing more than a reference to traditional, applicable juristic rules based on
the sect of the litigants. The resolution was never approved by the United
States-occupier at the time-and ultimately it was repealed in a raucous session
that ended in a walkout by the Shi'a Islamist forces. But, it was a harbinger of
further events. After all, it was obvious to everyone even in the summer of 2003
that the United States would not remain in Iraq forever. When it left, Shi'a
Islamist political power would be considerable given the seeming political
predispositions of the masses of Iraq's majority Shi'a population.
The Shi'a Islamists ultimately used that political clout to include the
infamous Article 41 in the final Iraq Constitution.3 9 That article contemplates the
"freedom" of Iraqis to live by their own rules of personal status based on their
"religions, sects, beliefs and choices."40 It also indicated that this freedom is to be
"organized by law," as indeed it would have to be in order to make any sense at
all.41 The draft Ja'fari Personal Status Code purports to be nothing more than the
organizing law called for under Article 41 for Iraq's majority Shi'a population.42
To summarize, the articulated demand for a specifically Shi'i Personal
Status Code was one that insisted on the precise replication of juristic rules. It
36 Id. at 200.
37 Stilt, supra note 24, at 751.
38 LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE
BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 172 (2005).
39 See Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting
History, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 21 (2007).
40 Hamoudi, Money Laundering, supra note 20, at 102.
41 If there is to be any law respecting personal status, then that law will inevitably
restrict the "beliefs and choices" of some people. Hence, the best way to read Article 41 is
as being a law that permits, indeed even endorses, family law pluralism, but leaves it to the
legislature to determine the precise contours of that pluralism. Id. The Federal Supreme
Court of Iraq has effectively adopted that interpretation, refusing to replace or reinterpret
the existing Personal Status Code in the absence of legislative action. Id. at 204-05
(discussing Federal Supreme Court of Iraq Decision 59 of 2011).
42 Stipulated Reasons, Ja'fari Personal Status Code (Iraq) (draft 2013) [hereinafter
Draft Ja'fari Code] (on file with author). It should be noted that copies of the draft Code
were widely disseminated throughout Iraq in the early part of 2014, and some copies
remain available on the Internet. See, e.g., Al Masalah Publishes the Draft Ja fari Personal
Status Law, (May. 5, 2016, 9:37 AM), http://almasalah.com/ar/News/18949/%/D8%/
A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AAD9%86%D8%B4%D8%
Bl-%D9%86%D8%B5-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%BlD9%88%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8
%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%ADD9%88%D8
%A7%D9%84-.
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neither accepted amalgamation of juristic rules of different sects to create a
uniform code, nor did it contemplate that the legislature could somehow modify,
qualify, reform, or restructure juristic rules in any meaningful fashion in the area
of personal status to realize broader public interest values. Whether these
approaches, or others, could be justified in a modem state under any Islamic
constitutional theory is a rich and deserving subject of debate elsewhere in the
academic literature.43 It is also entirely irrelevant in this particular context of
personal status and Shi'ism, where the persistent demand has been the precise,
narrow and strict replication of juristic rules.
To be clear, this sort of narrow reconstruction of juristic rules into the
stuff of modem legislation is not an easy task. Jurists write their rules in a fashion
that is designed to enable the believer to live a good and righteous life, while
legislation serves a different social purpose altogether.44 To attempt to make
juristic rules into state legislation is thus to turn them into something they were
never intended to be, and indeed almost by necessity radically restructures them.
For example, much thought would need to be given to precisely what to do with a
religious rule that "recommended" but did not "require" particular conduct on the
part of a believer, or how to treat the substantial number of Shi'i rules that are
described as "precautionary," meaning there is some doubt as to the permissibility
of a given action and thus it is better to avoid it rather than risk falling into sin.45
Yet even if the project would be technically quite difficult, and indeed almost
inevitably result in some level of distortion of the original rules themselves, the
goal is nevertheless conceptually rather straightforward. It is to give life to the
43 Clark Lombardi, for example, describes various types of Islamic lawmaking in
the modem Muslim world that are flexible and nuanced, and certainly do not merely
replicate juristic rules of medieval origin. CLARK LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW
IN MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI'A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 78-100 (2006). Mohammed Fadel makes the argument that the classical Sunni
Islamic state did broadly validate and legitimate lawmaking in a fashion that was
independent of juristic rulemaking. Mohammad Fadel, A Tragedy of Politics or Apolitical
Tragedy, 131 J. AM. ORIENTAL Soc. 109, 118-23 (2011). Asifa Quraishi has similarly taken
the position that the traditional Islamic state operated on a principle of the separation of
powers that gave it broad authority to develop its own law, even as the jurists separately
derived rules from sacred text independent of state authority. Asifa Quraishi, Separation of
Powers from the Perspective of Islamic Tradition, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 63, 63-65 (Tilmann J. Rdder & Rainer
Grote eds., 2012). Cf WAEL HALLAQ, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE 1-3, 10-14 (2013) (arguing
that the modern state and its methods of rule-making are incompatible with the Islamic
legal and political tradition).
44 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Understanding the Conflicts and Limitations of Iraq's
Draft Personal Status Law, JURIST (Mar. 31, 2014), http://jurist.org/forum/2014/03/haider-
hamoudi-personal-status.php [hereinafter Understanding the Conflicts and Limitations of
Iraq's Draft Personal Status Law].
45 Id. For an example of a precautionary rule, see infra Section III.C concerning the
ability of a child, upon reaching puberty, to disavow a marriage contracted for that child by
a father or grandfather.
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religious rules in the form of state law, and at the very least not to deviate from
them in order to serve some other political or ideological end. That this did not
come to pass when legislation finally appeared is therefore a matter of some
significance.
B. The Emergence of the Ja'fari Personal Status Code of 2014
On February 26, 2014, an image appeared across traditional and social
media outlets throughout Iraq, quickly went viral, and led to an intense debate.46
The photograph was of the Minister of Justice at the time, Hassan Shammari, of
the Shi'a Islamist Fadila party, stuffing a rolled-up document dozens of pages
long into the gilded latticework that surrounded the tomb of Imam Ali ibn Abi
Talib, the person to whom Prophet Mohammad was closest and his designated
successor, according to the Shi'a.47 The document in question was the Ja'fari
Personal Status Code, making its first public appearance, albeit in a manner that
obscured its content. His back to the camera, Shammari gave the appearance of a
devoted and determined man piously doing his duty to God and nation alike. The
depositing of the law in the tomb of Ali could almost be seen, in this light, as the
penultimate act of devotion, to be followed only by enactment of the law itself.
The act signified that finally, after decades of delay, God's Law would reign in the
land where the body of Muhammad's rightful successor lay buried.
A cynic, of course, might take a different view. The law Shammari took
such pains to advertise in this manner hardly spoke to Iraq's pressing problems. If
anything, it exacerbated them. 48 Other problems soon came to light. The draft
46 The image remains on the internet in various locations. See, e.g., After His
Attacks On The Religious Leadership, The Minister Of Justice Dedicates The Ja fari Law
At The Tomb Of Imam Ali, http://www.iraqpressagency.com/?p=45531&lang=ar (last
visited May 5, 2016). The intensity of the debate ultimately led to demonstrations of
substantial numbers of women in Baghdad's streets, all of whom were wearing black to
show opposition to the draft, for a period of four days around International Women's Day
on March 8. Afraj Shawqi, Iraqi Women Wear Black on Women's Day in Opposition to the
New Personal Status Law, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT (Mar. 9, 2014), http://archive.aawsat.com/
details.asp?section=4&article=764106&issueno=12885#.VNJz8p3F-X4.
47 MOOJAN MOMEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHI'I ISLAM: THE HISTORY AND
DOCTRINES OF TWELVER SHI'ISM 14-15 (1987).
48 There is a broad consensus that one of Iraq's core problems at the time of the
promulgation of the Ja'fari Personal Status Code, and one that helped lead to the rise of
ISIS, was the high degree of sectarian tension that existed between the majority Shi'a
population and the minority Sunni one. See, e.g., Kirk H. Sowell, Iraq's Second Sunni
Insurgency, HUDSON INSTITUTE (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.hudson.org/research/10505-
iraq-s-second-sunni-insurgency. It is hard to see how the replacement of a national law
with a series of laws that applied to individuals on the basis of their sect could possibly
ameliorate that problem.
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was atrociously drafted as a technical matter.49 Among other things, internal
contradictions and inconsistencies proliferated,o certain phrasings seemed
impossibly vague and incapable of being the subject of rational adjudication,5 1 and
the draft often used different words to denote the same concept.52
49 See Understanding the Conflicts and Limitations of Iraq's Draft Personal Status
Law, supra note 44.
5o Hence, Article 87 describes "fraud" in procuring a marriage in the following
manner:
Fraud is a characterization of a woman to a man in desire for marriage
that she is free of a fault with knowledge of its presence, or silence
about its appearance with knowledge of it, such that the man is
deceived because of it and proceeds to marriage.
Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at art. 87. Article 90 then indicates that "fraud is not
realized simply by the silence of the woman or her guardian." This leaves one entirely
confused as to whether silence over a "fault" (such as insanity, leprosy or other illness that
permits a husband to invalidate a marriage) in fact constitutes fraud. This is but one of
many examples. Id. at art. 90.
The definition of puberty for males is the attainment of fifteen years or earlier "if
one of the bodily signs depended on by the Muslim jurists appears." Id. at art. 16(1).
Grand Ayatollah Sistani describes this in more detail in his own juristic compendium:
1069: The signs of puberty . . . for a male are one of three: First, the
appearance of rough hair on the pubic region, irrespective of whether it
is thick or thin. Second, the ejaculation of semen, whether it is
ejaculated awake or in sleep, in sex or a dream or otherwise. Third, the
completion of fifteen years. ...
2 ALI AL-SISTANI, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN, 2:¶1069 (2008) (hereinafter SISTANI). These are
the repetition of long-standing rules centuries old and must therefore be that to which the
draft Code refers in its description of the "jurists of the Muslims." See, e.g., MUHAMMAD
HASAN AL-NAJAFI, 26 JAWAHIR AL-KALAM FI SHARH SHARA'I AL-ISLAM 5-6 (Abbas al-
Quchani ed. 1981) (ca. 1841) (hereinafter JAWAHIR). The idea that Iraqi judges would
adjudicate if a male had reached the legal age of adulthood for personal status purposes
based on the appearance of pubic hair, or the onset of masturbation or wet dreams, is too
ridiculous to contemplate.
Other highly ambiguous phrases appear as well, for example a clause entitling a
person to will their property to a non-Muslim except if "the will is characterized as aid to
the oppressors, or something similar, in which case it is not sound." Draft Ja'fari Code,
supra note 42, at art. 32.
52 Articles 81 and 82, for example, use two different terms to refer precisely to the
same concept. Article 81 indicates that if a marriage is invalidated after "penetration," then
a woman is entitled to the full dower for which she has contracted. Id. at art. 81. Article 82
indicates that a marriage cannot be invalidated because of a problem with a wife (for
example, her insanity) to the extent it occurs after the marriage contract is signed,
irrespective of whether this is before "intercourse" (wata' in Arabic) or after it. Id. at art.
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Why then rush such a plainly unsatisfactory, almost amateurish, draft in
the early part of 2014 to satisfy a demand that had stood unfulfilled for decades?
Why not take more time to produce a more careful and technically satisfactory
product? The reason is obvious, and common enough in any contemporary
democratic state. National elections were only weeks away when Shammari
introduced the draft Code. Shammari belonged to one Shi'i Islamist party, the
Fadhila.5 4 He was therefore obviously soliciting votes among the Shi'a faithful.
The aim was not to draw them away from voting for a Sunni dominated list or
even a multisect one, since there was no realistic danger of either of these
happening in large numbers. Rather the aim was to ensure that they supported
Fadhila over the other conservative Shi'i Islamist lists, among them the Sadrists,
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (formerly known as the Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), and the Da'wa party, since renamed the Coalition
for the State of Law and under the leadership of then Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki. The draft was thus a play for the votes of a very large Shi'i conservative
56base, upon whose support the premiership of the state hinged. In light of these
facts, the entire method of unveiling the law at the tomb of Shi'i Islam's most
revered figure, after the Prophet Muhammad himself, appeared more like a
meretricious publicity stunt rather than an act of devotion.
Nevertheless, despite the rather transparent political motivations for the
creation of the draft, it became nearly impossible for the other Islamist parties to
resist joining in support of it. Whatever misgivings they might have had about a
horribly drafted law and the vulgar manner in which it was unveiled paled in
comparison to the fear that the socially conservative Shi'a voters for whose
support they were competing might view them as somehow "secular" or at least
insufficiently committed to the substance of Shi'i Islam. Given these political
pressures, the cabinet endorsed the draft and sent it to the legislature for a vote in
late February.
Events, however, soon derailed the project. First, there was the fact that
one of the four Grand Ayatollahs of Najaf, Bashir al-Najafi, denounced the draft
82. This is but one of many places where the two terms seem to be used almost
haphazardly.
53 National elections were held in Iraq at the end of April of 2014. See Sowell,
supra note 48.
54 ALI A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE
PEACE 439 (2007) (describing Fadhila as one of the six major Shi'i Islamist parties in Iraq).
5 See id.
56 These different Shi'i Islamist parties find themselves vying with each other for
the support of the same Shi'i devout constituency quite frequently. For an example of
similar competition in 2009, see HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, NEGOTIATING IN CIVIL CONFLICT:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND IMPERFECT BARGAINING IN IRAQ 177-79 (2014).
Haifa Zangana, Jafari law takes the Iraqi government's violation of women's
rights to a new level, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/mar/14/jafari-law-iraqi-violation-women-rights-marital-rape.
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Code for its many flaws a day after the Cabinet had approved it.5 8  Soon
thereafter, ISIS took control of a number of Iraqi cities as the Iraqi army collapsed
and fled. 5 9 The nation plunged ever deeper into political crisis, ultimately leading
to the national legislature's selection of a new prime minister.60 Iraqis soon forgot
the Ja'fari Personal Status Code.
It is important, however, not to disregard the importance of the draft
Code. For one thing, its failure in one term hardly means something like it will
never find its way into law. After all, the bill was presented for a legislative vote
after one Shi'i Islamist party wrote it in some haste to demonstrate its religiosity,
and its closest competitors felt obligated to endorse it. Given this, it is not
inconceivable by any means that one party or another takes similar steps in the
future, and in fact forces a positive vote on the legislation, in particular if future
drafters amend parts of it in a manner that meet with Najaf's approval.
But more relevant for the purposes of this Article, even without its
enactment, is that the atrocious state of the draft reveals more clearly the stark
tensions between the two competing forces that led to its creation. The first of
these forces was the decades-long desire for the personal status law to reflect Shi'i
juristic rules for the Shi'i population. The second was the practical, ideological
predispositions of the socially conservative Shi'i voters whom the competing
parties were courting in promulgating (in the case of Fadhila) and endorsing (in
the case of the other Shi'i Islamist parties) the draft legislation.
Seen in this light, the hasty and awkward draft Code is quite worthy of
study. If there is to be a second attempt at such a Code, then it will likely prove to
be more carefully prepared. Having had the experience of this initial draft Code,
the authors of a new draft will probably recognize the tensions between religious
rules and conservative expectations and manage them with more subtlety, thereby
potentially disguising the important distinctions between the two. With the haste,
and the imprecision, the mask fell off. The awkward draft makes absolutely clear
that what the drafters are endorsing is not the realization of any sort of juristic
rulemaking, but rather a socially conservative vision of society endorsed by tribes
and rural notables with only casual resemblance to the version of Islam
promulgated by the jurists. The balance of the Article demonstrates how this is
so.
58 See Understanding the Conflicts and Limitations of Iraq's Draft Personal Status
Law, supra note 44 (indicating that Najafi described the Code in rather harsh terms as "rife
with flights of fancy in legal and juristic formulations that render it impossible that a jurist
would find it acceptable").
59 Iraq at a Crossroads: Options for U.S. Policy: Hearing before the United States
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 113th Congress (2014) (statement of Brett
McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran).
60 See Taylor, supra note 17 (respecting the election of al-Abadi as Prime Minister).
343
344 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 33, No. 2 2016
III. DISTORTING THE DOCTRINE AND MANAGING THE DIVIDE:
MARRIAGE AND THE DRAFT JA'FARI CODE
A. Marriage in Islamic Law
Of all of the traditionalist rules contained within the broad rubric of the
shari'a, few of them present as many problems in modernity as those concerning
marriage. The discrepancy with modern expectations, liberal and conservative,
begins with the very purpose of marriage. Within both Shi'i and Sunni traditions,
this purpose was to render sex licit, and the primary reason to do that is to
facilitate sexual enjoyment.61
Thus, focusing for the purposes of this Article on the rules of the Shi'i
tradition (though noting that the Sunni rules are not markedly different),62 a man's
primary obligations are to pay his wife in two forms. The first is a dower agreed
upon between the parties at the time that the contract for marriage is concluded,
which can be virtually anything of value.63 If they fail to make an agreement on
the dower to be given to the wife in exchange for the marriage, the contract is
valid, and a "dower of equivalence" is imposed. This is calculated by comparing
the bride to a woman of similar station and similar characteristics in matters such
as youth, virginity, intelligence, morals, elegance, and honor.64
According to these traditional rules, the payment terms are tied rather
closely to sexual intercourse. Specifically, a husband need only pay half of the
dower if he divorces his wife before he has sex with her.65 Should he fail to pay
66the part of the dower due when the contract is signed, the woman may refuse
sexual intercourse until he does.67 The connection of the dower to sexual
intercourse is even clearer in the circumstances where dower is due in the absence
of a marriage. Hence, if a man rapes a virgin, or otherwise causes the tearing of
her hymen without her consent, he must pay the dower of equivalence for a virgin
61 See TUCKER, supra note 4 at 41.
62 A good review of the traditional Sunni juristic rules comparable to those
discussed in the main text with respect to Shi'ism is contained in id. at 41-59. Because the
focus of the Article is on the Ja'fari draft Personal Status Code, which purports to be the
realization of Shi'i rules applied exclusively to Iraq's Shi'a, I do not discuss Sunni
conceptions of marriage in very much depth.
63 See, e.g., SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶287; JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:3-4
(relating a story wherein the Prophet Muhammad suggested a dower involving an indigent
husband teaching his wife a verse of the Qur'an).
64 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶¶294-95; JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:49, 52.
65 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶306; JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:80.
66 The dower can be paid in full at the time of contract, or some or all of it can be
deferred to a later date. SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶302.
67 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:41.
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as damages.68 Earlier jurists create an entire category referred to as the "losing of
the vulva" where dower would be due from a third party if that third party made it
impossible for a husband to have sex with his wife again.69 Examples include a
circumstance where a father had sex with his son's wife, thereby preventing the
son under long standing shari'a rules from having sex with her again.7 0
The other significant financial obligation of the husband to his wife is to
provide for his wife in the form of shelter, clothing, and food, at a standard that a
woman of her station would reasonably expect.71  Sistani describes ancillary
obligations as well. For example, a man cannot "oppress" his wife, or even
verbally assault her, and if he intends to leave her, he should divorce her rather
72than leave her "hanging," neither married nor divorced.
In return, the jurists encapsulate a woman's primary obligation through
the frequent use of a single word-tamkeen, roughly translated as "enablement."
Specifically, a wife must "enable" her husband to enjoy her body at a time and
place of his choosing, with very limited exceptions.7 4 Her ancillary obligation is
68 Id. at T319; ABDUL MAJID AL-KHU'L, 2 MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN ¶1351 (1992);
MUHAMMAD SAEED AL-HAKIM, 3 MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN T161, http://alhakeem.com/arabic/
pages/book.php?bcc=1485&itg=1&bi=56&s=ct (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
69 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:2.
70 Id.
71 KHU'L, supra note 68, at 287; JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:330
72 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶240. Other jurists do not categorize these specifically
as a wife's rights in marriage, though analogous provisions appear. For example, earlier
texts contain passages that enable a wife to petition a judge under circumstances where a
husband has left her but not divorced her for permission to obtain financial support from
her husband's resources. JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:353-54. This is not, however,
described as a wife's right, but rather a means for a wife to ensure that her husband fulfills
his obligation. Thus, this rule appears within a broader section outlining the parallel
obligations of support on the part of the husband, and enablement on the part of the wife.
Sistani's re-categorization of this as a wife's "right" recalls Robert Cover's invaluable
insight that Western secular society often adopts the discourse of rights where religious law
(and in his specific instance, Jewish law) prefers the language of obligations. Robert M.
Cover, A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. L. & REL. 65, 65 (1987). I might
only add that even the most traditionalist of contemporary authorities in Shi'i Islam have
been influenced enough by post enlightenment secular trends as to recast religious law in
the discourse of rights as well.
73 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:303
74 Id. at 303 ("when she enables him ... such that she assigns neither a place nor a
time for which his enjoyment is permitted for them, then he must support her, and if she
does not, then he has no obligation."); SISTANI, supra note 51, ¶337 ("the right of a husband
against his wife is that she enable him to near her, and otherwise [enable him] for the
enjoyments established for him as the [marriage] contract requires, at any time he wishes,
and that she does not prevent him except for a legitimate reason . . . .") As Sistani's text
indicates, a woman can deny her husband sex in certain, limited circumstances. For
example, she has no obligation to "enable" him when she is sick. JAWAHIR, supra note 51,
at 31:312. Similarly, in keeping with the Prophet Muhamad's statement that "there is no
obedience to a creature that involves disobedience to the Creator," a woman's performance
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not to leave the marital home without his permission, as this plainly interferes
with a husband's right to enjoy his wife sexually whenever he wishes. A wife's
failure to uphold her obligations entitles her husband to deny her maintenance
because of her "rebelliousness."7 6 In addition to denying her support, a husband
'77
may discipline a rebellious wife by verbally chastising her. If that fails, he may
leave her bedside. If this does not work to prevent her rebelliousness, then he
may beat her to the minimum extent necessary to achieve her obedience, with the
purpose of discipline and not revenge, so long as the beating is not so severe as to
cause bruising or bleeding.79 If the beating exceeds these bounds, then he must
pay damages for the injury incurred.80
Historic juristic texts, Sunni and Shi'i, had little trouble explaining much
of this through an explicit comparison to sale.8 1  To quote one of the most
influential Shi'i juristic compendia:
As is explained in the book of sale, the essence [of sale] is as a
name for the transfer of possession, not for the contract and not
for the process of transferring it. We said that what is uniform
in all of its uses is the actual oral expression in the contract
offer. . . . So what is desired from "I sell" as an offer is not "I
contracted" nor even the delivery, but the transfer of possession.
This all applies in the oral expression "I marry" as an offer, as
the desire in the contract would be debauchery, and sex, so there
is nothing left but the transfer of the possession of the vulva, the
exercise of power over it, and the settled establishment of that
power, and that is what is desired in a marriage, as with sale,
conciliation, lease and other [contracts].82
of obligatory fasting, prayer or pilgrimage frees her of her enablement obligation while
performing those obligations. The same is not true, however, for religious observances that
are not obligatory, but merely recommended or permitted. JAWAHIR, supra note 51,
31:314.
SISTANI, supra note 51, ¶337; JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:314.
76 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:314.
n SISTANI, supra note 51, T353.
78 Id.
79 Id.
so Id. The rules as cited in the main text concerning wife beating are those of
Sistani. Other jurists do not delve into this level of detail respecting the limitations of a
husband's physical discipline. Khu'i, for example, only indicates that in the case of
rebelliousness, if admonishment and leaving the bedside do not succeed, then a husband
"may strike his wife without causing bruising or the breaking of bones." KHU'L, supra note
68,2: 1365.
8 See ALI, supra note 6, at 6.
82 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:7 (emphasis added).
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In other words, what constitutes a legitimate sale is not the contract itself, or the
process of delivering the item sold, but in fact the actual transfer of possession.
Similarly, an offer for marriage does not constitute a marriage, nor does the
process of conveying a desire for sex, as this is merely debauchery. Rather, it is
the transfer of possession of the wife's vulva, and the exercise by the husband of
his power over the vulva, which renders it a legitimate contract for marriage.
Hence the woman is the seller, and she offers her body, and the man is the
purchaser, who concludes the contract when he takes possession of it.
Then, the balance of the rules set forth above fall into place. Naturally, a
dower must be due to a raped virgin, as that which she had the right to sell has
been taken. Similarly, it follows from this that a woman cannot deny a man
sexual intercourse at a time and place of his choosing. Because he has purchased
her genitalia through marriage, she can no more deny him access to his purchase
than one who sells a horse can deny its new owner use of it.
Beyond a doubt, any devout, Muslim liberal would find these
traditionalist rules offensive in the extreme and moreover regard them as the result
of a patriarchal reading of sacred text rather than some sort of necessary
interpretation of it.84 However, even Muslim social conservatives are troubled by
some of the more obvious commercial implications. Their imagination of
marriage includes a wife's sexual obedience, but it also involves almost Victorian
ideals of child rearing and homemaking as well.85 This is certainly not part of the
marital bargain in the juristic texts.86 That is to say nothing of love and intimacy,
which is very much part of the Muslim conception of marriage in our times,
among liberals and conservatives alike, but not contemplated by the juristic rules.
The Qur'anic verse most commonly cited by imams and clerics in modem Muslim
weddings comes from the Chapter of Rome, referring to the mercy and tenderness
that God puts between spouses.8 7 The juristic references to sale of a vulva hardly
seem consonant with this part of Islam's Holy Book.
Conservative discomfort might well explain why contemporary jurists,
while not altering the substantive rules, have also not attempted to explain their
origins or justify them through sale analogies in their compendia. A fascinating
83 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (concerning the obligation of a rapist to
pay a dower of equivalence).
84 See, e.g., WADUD, supra note 6, at 2-3 (indicating that historic interpretations of
the Qur'an were almost always undertaken by men and that this has affected contemporary
understandings of it).
85 ALI, supra note 6, at 6.
86 Sistani, for example, makes clear that a husband cannot obligate his wife to
perform household chores, nor is she derelict in her marital obligations for failing to do
them, even if her voluntary performance of them is religiously recommended. SISTANI,
supra note 51, 3: ¶340.
87 Qur'an 30:21 (Yusuf Ali trans. 1934) ("And among His Signs is this, that He
created for you mates from among yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquillity with them,
and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts): verily in that are Signs for those who
reflect.").
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example lies in the explanation respecting a wife's right to deny her husband sex
until she receives her dower. The Jawahir, relying upon the sale analogy common
in Shi'i texts before the twentieth century, explains this as follows:
She may refuse sex and the surrendering of her body until she
receives her dower by agreement, and the same is true for lifting
her veil and other matters. This is because the marriage with the
dower is compensation for [those actions]. She is not alone
using these appropriate means. Every party to be compensated
may refuse to surrender until they receive the compensation.
Based on the report of Zur'a bin Sama'a, "I asked him about a
man who married a maiden and enjoyed her then she rendered
him free of his dower. May he have intercourse with her before
he gives her anything? He said, 'Yes. If she rendered him free,
then she has taken the dower from him."' But for
embarrassment, difficulty, harm, or oppression, she should not
deny him, because the vulva is compensation by consensus, and
the marriage is compensation first. Based on plentiful texts [i.e.
original source material], what the husband gives her enables
him to have sex with her, and makes her vagina permissible to
him.8 8
Hence, the Jawahir tells us a woman who has not received her dower can of
course deny sex, just like any seller who has not received his advance payment for
the item he is selling may refuse to surrender the item sold. Once payment is
given, however, the woman must tender her body because it is then under his
possession. Consequently, she cannot after he has paid deny him out of
embarrassment, difficulty, or even harm.
In contrast to the Jawahir, Sistani's analogous rule appears in far more
cursory form as follows:
If a dower is immediate, then the wife may refuse enablement
before she takes it, irrespective of whether the husband was
capable of delivering it or not. But if she enables him of her,
then she cannot deny him after that until she receives it.8 9
The rule is largely similar, entitling a woman to deny sex before she receives her
dower, but not entitling her to do so once she has already consented to sex. Yet
88 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:41.
89 SISTANI, supra note 51, ¶306. There is a slight yet potentially significant
difference in that the Jawahir suggests that the dower is constructively paid by a woman
who consents to sex, while Sistani does not intimate this, indicating only that the woman
may no longer refuse sex pending receipt of the dower. In the interests of space, I do not
address this distinction herein.
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the bases for the rule have disappeared, thereby allowing modem clerics to
describe the dower more as a gift that a husband must give to his wife, the Islamic
equivalent of the contemporary diamond ring.90  Such clerics also properly
describe the dower as protection against an arbitrary divorce by a husband, given
that the husband must tender any dower not paid during the marriage no later than
death or divorce. 91 In other words, a husband with a large outstanding dower
might hesitate before pronouncing divorce because he would then become liable
for the full amount of the dower balance immediately.
Yet even if these descriptions are somewhat accurate, they are
incomplete. They do not explain a fair number of the rules described above. It
would be odd to demand the return of half of the value of a diamond ring if there
had been no sex prior to the dissolution of the marriage. It would be odder still to
obligate the rapist of a virgin to give his victim a gift, and the idea of insurance
against divorce in such an instance is entirely incoherent.
In any event, given the helpful mask on doctrinal origins of dower
provided by Sistani, and supported by the discourse of contemporary lower level
clerics and imams, the fiction respecting the purposes of marriage and its
attendant rules within the historic tradition becomes plausible enough to render
the matter more appealing to Muslim social conservatives. As such, it is
unsurprising for the most part that the draft Code repeats the juristic rules in large
part on the matters described in this section. Articles 101-02 of the draft Code
read as follows:
Article 101: The right of the husband over his wife are two
matters:
(1) That he she enables him to near her for the enjoyments
established for him in accordance with the contract at any time
that he wishes, that she does not prevent him except for a
legitimate reason, and that she does not take any action that
denies his right of enjoyment; and
(2) That she does not leave the marital home except with his
permission.
90 See, e.g., Sayyid Moustafa al-Qazwini, Divorce, Divorce and Mahr
Proprietorship, in AL-ISLAM.ORG, AHLUL BAYT DIGITAL ISLAMIC L1BRARY PROJECT, http://
www.al-islam.org/a-new-perspective-women-islam-fatma-saleh-moustafa-al-qazwini/
chapter-3-divorce-divorce-and-mahr#divorce-and-mahr ("The [dower] is a gift to the wife
irrespective whether of the marriage continues or later dissolves. If the husband has not
paid the [dower] in full, then he will still be held liable for the remaining balance, despite
the reasons for divorce."). Sayyid Qazwini is one of the most well-known and widely
followed Shi'i clerics in the United States. He is the founding Imam of the Islamic
Educational Center of Orange County, California. Id. at About the Authors.
91 Id.
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Article 102: The right of the wife over the husband is limited to
the following:
(1) That he spends on her for her good, her shelter and all that
she needs based on her station;
(2) That he does not hurt or oppress her, nor quarrel with her
without a legitimate reason;
(3) That he does not abstain from her entirely, and render her
hanging, neither married nor divorced; and
(4) That he does not leave from near her for more than four
months, and if the wife cannot be patient for four months, then
the husband must come nearer before the four months, or
92divorce her and free her path.
Similarly, the rules on dower indicate that a woman has the right to the
dower set by the contract.93 If no dower is named, then a dower of equivalence is
imposed. 94 A dower of equivalence is also imposed on rapists, though the draft
Code seems not to distinguish between the rape of virgins and non-virgins in the
manner that the juristic texts do.95
It is precisely rules such as these that led to the outcry against the draft
law by liberal and secular forces.96 Yet that did not matter at all to the drafters of
the Ja'fari Code, who could count on the opposition of those secular and liberal
forces to their law no matter how it was framed. What was important to the
drafters was that the rules align well with the expectations and predispositions of
the conservatives whom they were courting. This they certainly do. If most of the
bedrock supporters of a draft Ja'fari Code also allowed for such elements as
companionship and intimacy to play a role in marriage as well, they would not
necessarily insist on the recognition of such matters in legislation. So long as the
references to sale remained implicit, and marriage could be plausibly described as
much greater than a barter of sexual access, the devout could be satisfied by the
traditional formulations. In the end, mirroring Sistani's rules worked to satisfy the
constituencies who might support the bill. This proved not to be the case with
other important aspects of marriage, however, as further described below.
92 Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at arts. 101-02.
93 Id. at art. 9 1.
94 Id. at art. 92.
95 Id. at art. 91. This might very well be another area where the drafters changed
the juristic rules in order to meet Muslim social conservative expectations. I do not discuss
it, however, because it is possible that this is merely the result of shoddy work and
inattention to detail. It is not obvious that social conservatives would necessarily have
strongly held views on the specific rules regarding rape and dower. This is not true of the
other matters discussed in the balance of the Article, where the decision to derogate from
the rules is perfectly obvious.
96 See, e.g., Shawqi, supra note 46 (describing days-long demonstrations against the
law); Zangana, supra note 57 (offering extensive criticisms of the law).
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B. The Temporary Marriage
A modem problem concerning the historic analogy between marriage and
sale arises solely within Shi'ism because of a curious additional form of marriage.
This is the temporary, or "pleasure," marriage. 97 Where Shi'i jurists historically
would analogize marriage to sale, as described in the previous section, they
analogize the temporary marriage to lease, with the dower being the necessary
compensation for the lease.98 The Jawahir explains the distinction as follows:
The dower is a special condition of the temporary marriage, and
the contract is void without it, without disagreement and indeed
by consensus. It is the basis [for it] based on the statement [of
Shi'a Islam's Sixth Imam] 'there is no temporary marriage,
without two matters. A set time, and a set rent.' . . . And in
other report, 'the women are leased,' as with the statement [of
the Fifth Imam] 'she is leased.' From this the difference is
known between the permanent, with whom one wishes offspring
and the like, and the temporary, from whom one desires usufruct
and pleasure and the like, as a result of which it resembles a
lease, and thus the dower is compensation for the lease and a
condition for its validity. 99
The wife must, moreover, "enable" her husband precisely as in an ordinary
marriage in exchange for the dower, and partial enablement leads to a reduction in
the dower, as described below.
Thus, it is obligatory to pay the dower required in the contract . .
. as the dower earned, but it is settled upon intercourse and her
fulfillment of enablement during the period [of the marriage]...
. [A man said] to the Sixth Imam, "I married a woman for a
month, and she wants the entire dower, but I fear she will stay
away from me. He said 'it is not permitted to hoard that which
she has power over, but if she does stay away from you, then
take back [the dower] in the amount that she has stayed
away."100
Unsurprisingly, as with permanent marriage, the explicit references to leasing the
genitalia of women have disappeared from the discourse of modem jurists.
Hence, Sistani summarizes the same rules set forth above without that analogy:
97 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 30:139-49 (describing the differences between the Sunni
and Shi'i positions on the temporary marriage at some length in a polemical fashion).
98 Id. at 30:162.
99 Id.
'oo Id. at 30:164.
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Marriage is a contract between a man and a woman, pursuant to
which each of them is permissible to the other. It is of two
types: permanent and temporary. The permanent contract is one
where the duration of the marriage is not set, and the wife is
called she who is permanent. The non-permanent contract is
one where a duration is set, as an hour, a day, a year, or more or
less, and the wife is called she who is enjoyed, or temporary.
It is a condition of the temporary marriage to name the dower.
If there is a contract without a named dower, intentionally or out
of ignorance or forgetfulness, it is invalid....
She who is enjoyed owns the entire dower of the contract, but it
is settled entirely on condition that she does not breach her
enablement set forth for her as a requirement in the contract. If
she breaches for part of the period, then her husband may take
from the dower in proportion [of the failure to enable] ... 101
As the above passage makes clear, try as they might, jurists cannot disguise the
inherently commercial nature of the transaction as they can in the case of
permanent marriage. A modem traditionalist cleric might be able to describe the
dower as a "gift" in a permanent marriage, and sustain a fiction that indeed it is a
gift rather than compensation for sex despite rules which strongly suggest
otherwise, and despite historic texts which very much say otherwise.102 The same
principle is simply not credible in the case of a marriage that can last as little as an
hour, or less. Other rules, such as the fact that a husband in a temporary marriage
owes no support to his wife, even if she becomes pregnant by him, only help to
fortify the conclusion that what is involved in a temporary marriage is neither
intimacy nor child rearing.'03 It is quite obviously the sale of sex.
Given all of this, modem developments respecting the temporary
marriage have usually involved Sunni polemicism and Shi'i apologetics. As
concerns Sunni polemics, it is easy for modem Sunni clerics to disparage Shi'ism
for permitting temporary marriages once Sunnism had successfully disguised the
commercial nature of the permanent Islamic marriage contract as Sunni classical
jurists explicated it. Hence, for example, the leading commentator on Iraq's
Personal Status Code, the Sunni Ahmed al-Kubaisi, indicates that a condition of
the marriage is that it be permanent, explaining as follows:
Marriages [that are for a limited duration] contradict the
religious purpose of marriage, which is a settled life, the
101 Id. at ¶¶30, 233, 237. Exceptions lie where intercourse would not be permissible,
and in particular during the wife's menstrual period. JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at ¶237.
102 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
103 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, ¶256.
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permanence of intimacy, the establishment of family, the raising
of children, the assumption of responsibility, the realization of
social solidarity, and the organization of civilization which
results in the building of the self and the continuation of life....
[The temporary marriage] is deemed corrupt in Iraqi courts, and
it has no consequences of a valid marriage.104
As a traditionalist who does not hesitate to express his outrage at "innovations"
that derogate from the traditional juristic rules, such as legal restrictions on
polygamy, 0 5 Kubaisi is surely aware of his intellectual dishonesty in describing
the "religious purpose" of marriage in classical texts as relating to intimacy,
settling down, and assuming family duties and responsibilities. Surely, given his
insistence that other traditional juristic rules be followed without reform, the more
honest approach would be to describe the Islamic juristic rules for permanent
marriage as what they are-the sale of a vulva for support and a dower.106 Yet as
we have seen, the re-characterization of the purposes of permanent marriage
(without simultaneously changing its rules) has been dramatically successful in
the modem era.1 07 Indeed, it has been so successful that a criticism that medieval
Sunni scholars could not have possibly had about the temporary marriage-that it
is commercial in nature and that it is centered on sex-is one that a Sunni cleric
can credibly raise as the reason to ban temporary marriages.
For their part, Shi'i Iraqis are aware of the juristic permissibility of the
temporary marriage, and yet are uncomfortable with it. It is a form of marriage
that is not engaged in with any regularity, and regarded with extreme hostility as a
104 AHMED AL-KUBAISI, 1 PERSONAL STATUS IN THE FIQH, THE COURTS AND THE LAW
70-71 (2d ed. 2007). As an additional example of these sorts of polemics on the Internet,
see A. Muhammad, Does the Quran Permit Temporary (Mut'ah) Marriages, TRUE ISLAM,
http://www.quran-islam.org/articles/part_4/temporarymarriages_(P1437).html (last visited
Mar. 27, 2016):
God would never advocate sin, not plain sin nor disguised sin. Anyone
who writes a temporary marriage certificate for the sake of sexual
activities is trying to disguise his sin. In fact he would not be any
different from someone who hires a prostitute for a day or a week for
sexual services. The only difference is that the first man conjured up a
piece of paper and adds the title "marriage" to it! But the act, in
purpose and execution, is the same.
105 KUBAISI, supra note 104, at 110-15. Kubaisi goes so far as to describe some of
the efforts to ban polygamy as part of a plot to limit the number of Muslims in the world.
Id. at 111.
106 See Asifa Quraishi-Landes, A Meditation on Mahr, Modernity and Muslim
Marriage Contract Law, in FEMINISM, LAW AND RELIGION 178 (Marie A. Failinger,
Elizabeth R. Schiltz and Susan J. Stabile eds. 2013); see also ALI, supra note 6, at 6.
107 See ALI, supra note 6, at 6.
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practical matter.1 08 The idea that a virgin Iraqi woman of any age would actually
be able to lease her genitalia for an hour to a man would horrify Iraqi conservative
forces, from urban elite to tribal elder. Tribal leaders have told me quite directly
that they regard this as fornication meriting death, waving off in indignation and
embarrassment any questions respecting the legality of the pleasure marriage.109
This creates a problem for the drafters of the Ja'fari Personal Status
Code. To draft a code without any reference to the pleasure marriage would
plainly disregard a core element of Shi'i marriage doctrine in deference to the
Sunni prohibitions on the practice. This is precisely the type of legislative
selectivity that the Code is supposed to eradicate, as part of a long-standing Shi'i
demand to live by self-defined rules of personal status.1 10 Yet to keep it would
legalize and legitimize a practice which deeply embarrasses most Shi'a, and which
Sunnis would use as part of a broader polemical assault on Shi'ism.
The solution by and large was to dispense with pleasure marriage entirely
in the draft Ja'fari Personal Status Code. It is simply too far removed from the
contemporary Iraqi experience and too problematic on normative grounds that
exist independently of juristic texts to be able to receive due recognition in a draft
law. Hence, the draft Code's rules of marriage nowhere suggest that marriage
might be temporary and nowhere include reference to how durations might be set
during contracting. Perhaps even more importantly, the husband's obligation to
support his wife during a marriage is set forth in unconditional terms in Article
102, thereby explicitly derogating from the Shi'i rule which has no such support
obligation in a temporary marriage." The same is true for other areas where the
rules for temporary marriage differ from those of permanent marriage. In each
and every case, the draft Code sets forth rules for permanent marriage and does
not mention at all the different rules for the temporary marriage established in the
juristic texts.112 In other words, the drafters adopted the Sunni position on
los KUBAISI, supra note 104, at 7 n.2 ("From a practical standpoint, [the Shi'a], and
especially those we have in Iraq, do not engage in [temporary marriage] and deem it among
the contemptible forms of marriage.").
109 In the spring of 2013, I spent a great deal of time in Iraq interviewing tribal
leaders and observing tribal resolution processes with two professors from Basra University
School of Law, Wasfi al-Sharaa and Aqeel al-Dahan. Most of my time was spent among
Shi'i tribes located in Baghdad, particularly Sadr City, though inevitably members of those
tribes had relocated from elsewhere. The fruit of our research will appear in Haider Ala
Hamoudi, Wasfi Alsharaa & Aqeel al-Dahan, The Resolution of Disputes in State and
Tribal Law in the South of Iraq: Toward a Cooperative Model of Pluralism, in
NEGOTIATING STATE AND NONSTATE LAW: THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL
PLURALISM 215 (Michael A. Helfand ed., 2015).
110 See supra Section I.A (describing formal reason for Code being to permit the
Shi'a to live by their own rules of sect).
t Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at art. 102 (1) (describing support as the right
of a wife against her husband).
112 For example, the draft Code sets forth specific rules respecting when a man may
pronounce a unilateral divorce against his wife. Id. at arts. 135-36. It does not mention the
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temporary marriage, a remarkable result for a Code whose very purpose was to
enable the Shi'a not to have to abide by Sunni rules imposed on them. 13
There is one curious exception to this, however. In one, and only one,
place in the draft Code, there is an implicit reference to the temporary marriage
being permissible. This lies in Article 63, which reflects the long-standing Shi'i
juristic rule that a Muslim may not marry a non-Muslim.114 This is in contrast to
the Sunni rules (and the existing Personal Status Code, which adopts Sunni rules
on this point), which permit a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman,
though not the reverse, so long as she is what is regarded in Islamic discourse as a
"Person of the Book," defined generally as the follower of an Abrahamic
religion. 1 5
While Shi'ism does not permit marriages outside of Islam generally, it
does provide an exception for Muslim men engaged in temporary, rather than
permanent, marriage.116 Interestingly, Article 63 recognizes this distinction,
indicating that, "a marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim is not sound as
an absolute matter, and the permanent marriage of a Muslim man to a woman
other than a Muslim, or an apostate from the Islamic religion, is not sound as an
absolute matter." 17 The reference to "permanent" breaks the Code's general
approach of disregarding the temporary marriage, given that it suggests that there
is a type of nonpermanent marriage pursuant to which a Muslim man might marry
a non-Muslim woman, but not the reverse.
The reason for this is again an attempt to placate potentially socially
conservative Shi'a who might be expected to support the bill. The phenomenon of
intermarriage between Iraqi men and foreign women was widespread enough to
result in the constitution specifically granting Iraqi citizenship rights to anyone
born to an Iraqi parent, even if the other parent was foreign, without objection
from Shi'a Islamist forces." 8 This is unsurprising because among urban elites in
prohibition against divorce in temporary marriage, despite this being a clear rule
concerning the temporary marriage. See SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: T252. Similarly, the
waiting period after which a divorced woman may generally remarry is set in the Code as
three menstrual cycles. Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at art. 155(2)(a). This is the rule
for the permanent marriage, but a temporary wife generally needs to wait only two
menstrual cycles. SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶259.
113 See supra Section L.A (describing formal reason for Code being to permit the
Shi'a to live by their own rules of sect).
114 Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at art. 63.
115 Iraq Personal Status Code, supra note 27, at art. 17; KUBAISI, supra note 104, at
109-10.
116 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶232; JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 30:155.
117 Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at art. 63 (emphasis added).
118 As has been reported, the constitutional provision did change the existing law and
did prove controversial because it granted citizenship to children of Iraqi women and non-
Iraqi men. Sara Burhan Abdullah, Citizenship and Women's Rights under the Iraq
Constitution, JURIST (Jan. 30, 2010), http://jurist.org/dateline/2010/01/iraq-citizenship-and-
womens-rights.php. However, there was broad agreement among all parties-Islamists and
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particular, a good number of Shi'is have over the past several decades married
foreigners, including non-Muslims.1 1 9 To declare all such marriages void, and
those engaged in it as fornicators, would be quite problematic not only for the
person engaging in the practice, but also for those who work and interact in the
same social circles. The law would delegitimize significant numbers of Iraqi
marriages, and prohibit a practice that is likely to continue.
Thus, the reference to permanent marriage in Article 63 was not so much
to legitimize the pleasure marriage as it was to deal with another problem in
which juristic rule does not conform to modern conservative social expectation,
and this relates to the broad acceptability of interreligious marriage among
Muslim men and non-Muslim women. The only real manner in which to permit
such marriages while still complying with religious dictate was to hint at their
permissibility through a separate vehicle, the pleasure marriage, which carries its
own, set of problems so severe that it is not referenced anywhere else in the Code.
The result is something of an obvious incoherence, and hardly an accurate
reflection ofjuristic rules.
C. The Child Marriage
Curiously, the drafters adopted a very different approach when
addressing another area of Islamic marriage law with deep roots that has proven
highly controversial in modernity: the area of child marriage. Before describing
the Code's treatment of this highly contentious issue, however, it is important to
review the historic rules.
1. Child Marriage in the Traditionalist, Juristic Texts
a. Age of Majority
secular forces, Shi'a and Sunnis-that a child born to an Iraqi man and a non-Iraqi woman
must be entitled to Iraqi citizenship by right, without any sort of restriction imposed
respecting the religion of the woman in question. See id.
119 A well-publicized example of this is provided in the case of Margaret Hassan, a
woman who married a Shi'i Iraqi when he was studying abroad, and then moved to Iraq
and obtained dual citizenship but never converted to Islam. James Sturcke, Iraqi Sentenced
to Life in Prison for Murder of Aid Worker Margaret Hassan, THE GUARDIAN (June 2,
2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/j un/02/margaret-hassan-iraq-murder-
sentence. When she was kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by a Sunni extremist
organization, there were large demonstrations protesting her death, and substantial numbers
of Iraqis were outraged. Id. The justice system continued to pursue the case, finally
convicting someone of the murder in 2009 and sentencing him to life in prison. To say the
least, it would have been an act of political folly for a draft Personal Status Code not to
recognize the validity of her marriage, or the marriages of others like her.
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Two relevant sets of rules exist in the traditional juristic formulations
across the Islamic schools. The first is that the age of "adulthood"-the age at
which one can marry and even consummate a marriage-is set at a much lower
age than it is in modem states. Describing the rules across schools, Kecia Ali
indicates that the date is set at puberty.120 Rudolph Peters says the same, though
he adds minimum and maximum ages before which puberty cannot be established
and after which it is presumed as a matter of law across the schools.121
The Shi'i texts support these conclusions for boys, indicating that first
ejaculation or the appearance of pubic hair signifies puberty.122 They set no
minimum age at which this might occur, but impose a maximum of fifteen years
at which a boy is defined as an adult as a matter of religious law.123 For girls,
however, the age the Shi'i jurists set is at nine lunar years, which is of course
much lower than allowed in most modem states and is also set entirely
independently of a girl's menarche or any other signs of puberty.124
b. Marriage before Legal Age of Majority
The second set of rules relating to child marriage is that across the
Islamic schools, the guardians of children in their legal minority, and especially
their fathers and paternal grandfathers, long had the power to contract them into
marriage.125 As discussed below, this raises two very significant and obvious
concerns. These are, respectively, the lack of consent from the girls and the
likelihood that physical harm will occur to the girl upon consummation of the
marriage. Each of these is discussed below.
i. Problems of Consent
The first concern is that this type of marriage effectively strips the right
to consent to marry away from the children whose guardians contracted them into
marriage. This does not seem consistent with the balance of the marriage rules
because, generally speaking, jurists have long deemed the consent of an adult
120 ALI, supra note 6, at 32.
121 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE FROM THE 16TH TO THE 21ST CENTURY 21 (2005).
122 JAWAHR, supra note 51, 26:5-6; KHU'I, supra note 68, 2:179.
123 JAWAHR, supra note 51, 26:16; KHU'I, supra note 68, 2:179.
124 JAWAHR, supra note 51, 26:38; KHU'I, supra note 68, 2:179; SISTANI, supra note
51, 2: ¶1069. This is at slight variance with Peters, who suggests that a girl under nine
might be deemed an adult upon menstruation. PETERS, supra notel2l, at 21. The
difference is largely academic, however, as the onset of puberty before the age of nine lunar
years seems generally unlikely as a matter of fact.
125 TUCKER, supra note 4, at 43.
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woman, virgin or non-virgin, necessary for a sound marriage.126 However, for
some reason, the jurists treated the matter of children differently. Children's adult
guardians plainly could contract them without their consent into marriage, though
there are important limitations and qualifications. 127
Hence, Grand Ayatollah Muhsen al-Hakim-the primus inter pares of
Najaf's Grand Ayatollahs when Iraq enacted its current Personal Status Code in
1959-indicated that contracting a marriage for a minor was permissible, though
it was reprehensible.128 He indicated that instead one should actually rush to
marry a girl upon her reaching the age of adulthood of nine lunar years, on the
basis of a report from Shi'i Islam's Third Imam that "it adds to the happiness of a
person that his daughter does not menstruate in his home." 129 Other twentieth
century jurists do not describe the child marriage as reprehensible, though they
also do not indicate the same level of haste respecting the marriage of one deemed
an adult, either.
Generally, under the traditional Shi'i rules, a girl's father or paternal
grandfather has the power to contract her into a marriage. If her brother or uncle
undertakes it, in the event that the father or paternal grandfather are deceased or
otherwise incapable, then the girl must consent to the marriage upon becoming an
adult in order for the marriage to be deemed valid.130 Similarly, if a father or
paternal grandfather has a corrupt purpose in undertaking the marriage, then the
marriage contracted requires the consent of the girl when she becomes an adult
(i.e., at the attainment of nine lunar years), as if an uncle or brother had contracted
the marriage instead. 131 The jurists do not define with any level of specificity
what they mean by a "corrupt purpose," though presumably it might include
contracting a girl into marriage for a lower than normal dower in exchange for a
personal payment from the husband or his family directly to the guardian. 132
126
127
128 MUHSEN IBN MAHDI TABATABA'I AL-HAKIM, 14 MUSTAMSIK AL-URWA AL-
WUTHQA 11 (1983).
129
130 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:203, 217; SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶57(indicating
that the father and grandfather have the power of guardianship as concerns marriage), ¶73
(indicating that a marriage contracted by a person other than a guardian or an agent depends
on the acceptance when the party being married consents); HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:436-
37.
131 See, e.g., KHu'I, supra note 68, 2:1236; HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:455-56.
132 Shi'i jurists contrast the power of a father or grandfather on the one hand, with
the power of other guardians on the other, by pointing out that with a father or grandfather,
the absence of a corrupt purpose is presumed, while in the case of other guardians, the
presumption is that the marriage is contracted in pursuit of a personal interest. This
presumption justifies the power of the father or grandfather to compel a marriage that a
different guardian could not compel upon the attainment of adulthood. See, e.g., JAWAHIR,
supra note 51, 29:197. The rule set forth in the main text that a father or grandfather with a
corrupt purpose cannot compel the marriage when the child is an adult can therefore be
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Moreover, as a matter of precaution, both Hakim and Sistani indicate that
the father or grandfather must perceive a benefit in the marriage. In other
words, the marriage is not valid unless there is an absence of a "corrupt purpose"
and there is some affirmative reason to undertake the marriage at such a young
age. Hence, Hakim indicates that if two people wish to marry a man's daughter,
and he chooses a less honorable groom over one who offers a lower dower, then
the validity of the marriage is thrown into doubt. 1 3 4 Practically, the "doubt"
means a sufficient uncertainty concerning the validity of such a marriage that it
should be clarified through marriage or divorce. 135 The same rules apply for a boy
contracted into marriage as for a girl. 1 3 6
A dispute arises, however, as to whether the contract is binding without a
determination of a "corrupt purpose" and where the father or grandfather can
claim some sort of benefit in the marriage. In other words, if a father contracts his
four-year-old son or daughter into a marriage with a husband who would broadly
be deemed suitable, and on a socially acceptable dower, is the marriage binding
upon the boy or girl should he or she seek to disavow it upon reaching adulthood?
The nineteenth century Jawahir states the contract is absolutely binding on the girl
and most probably on a boy as well, indicating that a girl's hatred of her
contracted husband is not a reason to fail to obey her father's dictate. 1 Hakim
similarly binds the girl absolutely and indicates that the better opinion is that the
boy is also bound to a contract arranged by a father or grandfather.1 3 8
Sistani takes a narrower view. He indicates that if a father or paternal
grandfather contracts a marriage for a child, male or female, it is valid absent a
"corrupt purpose" and the existence of a personal benefit.139 However, he adds
that the validity of the marriage "might depend on the establishment of an election
for the contracted party after adulthood and discernment." 140 If a woman
disavows a marriage her father or paternal grandfather contracted for her when she
was a child, then sufficient doubt exists as to the initial validity of the contract,
meaning that the contracted parties must either renew their wedding vows or the
seen as merely a logical extension of that same rule. That is, where an uncle would be
presumed to be contracting his niece into marriage for his own personal benefit rather than
hers, a father would be presumed not to do this as with his own son or daughter. If he were
found to be pursuing a "corrupt purpose," however, then the marriage he contracts would
be subject to invalidation by the child upon reaching adulthood, precisely as the contract by
an uncle would.
133 HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:455-56; SISTANI, supra note 51, 3:59.
134 HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:456-57.
135 Sistani lays out these alternatives in explicit detail. See SISTANI, supra note 51, 3:
T60.
136 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:203, 217; SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶57, ¶73;
HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:436-37.
137 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:172-73, 182.
138 HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:433-34.
139 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶60.
140
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husband must pronounce a divorce.141 This gives an adult woman the ability to
disavow a marriage contracted without her consent, given that her husband cannot
claim any benefits from the marriage unless he resolves the doubts surrounding
the marriage's validity, and given that those doubts can only be resolved with the
wife's consent to the marriage.
ii. Physical Harm
Beyond the lack of consent, another looming problem in contracting girls
into marriage before they reach the age of majority is the actual, physical harm
they are susceptible to from sex during childhood, or even worse, during infancy.
In deference to those concerns, there is broad agreement among Shi'i jurists that a
husband cannot consummate his marriage to a girl under the age of nine lunar
years, i.e., a girl who has not reached the technical age of majority.142 The
specific reason given is the inability of a girl that age to be able to physically
tolerate penetration.143 Consummation includes both anal and vaginal sex, but it
does not refer to "enjoyment" other than sex.144 To quote Sistani, "there is no
problem with . . . touching with appetite, kissing, embracing, and thighing." 145
Hakim reaches a largely similar conclusion, indicating that such sexual
enjoyments are available even with a child who is young enough to be still
-146
nursing.
A problem occurs when a husband ignores this directive and penetrates
his child wife before she reaches the age of nine. There is some source text that
suggests that after such penetration, the husband may never engage in sexual
intercourse with the girl ever again. However, jurists in the modern era have
rejected this source text in favor of alternative text, which holds that there are no
financial or legal consequences to the commission of this sin.147 The exception is
if the sex causes "ripping," whose precise definition the jurists dispute, but which
at its core refers to the tearing of a girl's genital area through sexual penetration
141 Id.
142 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:414; HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:78-79; SISTANI,
supra note 51, 3: ¶8; KHU'I, supra note 68, 2: ¶1230.
143 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:415.
144 Id. at 29:416.
145 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8.
146 HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:79-80. The final of these so-called enjoyments,
referred to by Sistani and Hakim alike as "thighing," is no more a word in Arabic than it is
in English. It is the creation of a verb from the noun "thigh." The Grand Ayatollahs leave
it to the reader's imagination as to what this refers, though the matter seems not terribly
difficult to discern.
147 See JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:417-19 (describing the rule, and the texts which
support a different conclusion); HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:80-82 (describing same in text
and accompanying footnotes). See also SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8.
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such that one of the urinal, vaginal, or anal pathways combines with one or more
of the other.1 48
In the case of "ripping" a girl, modem jurists take the position that the
husband owes her blood money for the injury, whether or not he divorces her,
despite some earlier disagreement in source texts which suggested that no blood
money was due if the woman remained married to the man.149 The blood money
for a free Muslim woman works out to approximately $100,000-a significant
sum in Iraq.1 5 0  If the "ripping" occurs when the husband consummates the
marriage and the girl is older than nine lunar years, the modem jurists seem to
agree that no blood money is due because the girl is considered an adult. 151
Intercourse is forbidden with a "ripped" wife if her husband injured her before she
was nine, at least until her wound heals.152 Intercourse with a wife "ripped" after
the age of nine, however, is permissible.1 5 3
However, whether the ripping occurs before or after consummation,
certain legal consequences of the marriage remain forever. Specifically, the wife
inherits from the husband as his spouse, he cannot marry her sister so long as she
is alive, he cannot take four wives in addition to her, and, most importantly, he
must support her financially. 1 5 4 While these are the regular consequences of
marriage, they usually cease to exist after a divorce. In the case of a "ripped"
wife, however, they remain in place, even if there is a divorce.
2. Child Marriage in the Draft Ja'fari Code
Liberal and secular forces within Iraq and beyond it would plainly find
such rules horrifying in the extreme, even more so than temporary marriage.
Where the human rights implications of the consensual barter of sexual enjoyment
for money as contemplated by the temporary marriage are at least ambiguous,1 5 5
condemnation of child marriage around the globe is broad and deep.156
148 See JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:419-21 (describing the definitional issues in
some detail); HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:85-86 (also describing the definitional issues in
detail). See also SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8.
149 See JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:422-23(describing the dispute); HAKIM, supra
note 128, 14:83-84 (also describing the dispute). See also SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8.
150 See infra notes 168-85 and accompanying text (offering a fuller description of the
blood money and the manner by which it is calculated).
151 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8; JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:422.
152 HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:83; SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8.
153 HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:88; SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8.
154 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:435-36; SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8; HAKIM, supra
note 128, 14:84, 91.
The rules of temporary marriage would create some problems for liberals, even
those who might favor legalized forms of prostitution. For example, while clearly a
woman's consent is necessary when she is an adult in order to engage in the temporary
marriage, in many cases a father's consent is necessary as well. See SISTANI, supra note
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That Iraqi liberals had powerful global allies on this question leads one to
think that the drafters might defer to liberal expectations. However, this law was
neither drafted to appeal to Muslim liberals, nor human rights activists, nor even
the broader international community. It sought to appeal to one, and only one,
constituency-Muslim social conservatives in Iraq. As such, the draft Code
adopts a version of child marriage that in some respects replicates juristic rules,
but in others departs from them significantly in a manner that renders them even
less protective of girls than the already problematic juristic rules.
The rules concerning the age of adulthood largely replicate those of
Sistani. They are buried in the section addressing wills, in what appears to be a
clumsy and amateurish attempt to make them more difficult for opponents to
locate. Nevertheless, Article 16 clearly states a definition of puberty for girls at
nine lunar years and for boys "fifteen lunar years or the realization of one of the
bodily signs depended upon by the jurists of the Muslims to establish puberty
among males."
Far more interesting are the provisions concerning the marriage of
children by their guardians. Articles 43(6), 50, and 51 together read as follows:
Article 43: The soundness of a contract for marriage depends on
the following conditions:
(6) That the contracting party is an adult and sane, hence neither
the contract of an insane person nor the contract for a discerning
child for himself is sound without the permission of the
guardian (the father and the paternal grandfather).
Article 50: The father and the grandfather from the side of the
father when sane and Muslim exclusively have the power to
marry the small child, male and female, or the insane person
whose insanity runs through puberty.
Article 51: The soundness of the marriage of a father or
paternal grandfather depends on the absence of a corrupt
purpose, and the realization of best interest in the contract of
51, 3:¶68. Still, the concept of a consensual arrangement that involved money for sex
might not be deemed to necessarily offend liberal sensibilities in a way that a child
marriage surely would.
156 To take the simplest example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
specifically requires that marriage only be entered into "with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses." G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art.
16(2) (Dec. 10, 1948). A similar provision is contained in Article 23 of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, to which 168 nations are party. International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights at art. 23, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-
20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
m Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at art. 16.
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marriage. Without it, the soundness of the contract depends on
the acceptance of it from the child after puberty or the insane
after recovering sanity.15 8
This is largely a repetition of Sistani's rules, with two important variations. First,
nowhere does it suggest, as Sistani does, that there is doubt as to the soundness of
a marriage that a child disavows at puberty as a general matter, even if the father
had the child's best interests in mind. 1 5 9 The Code drafters, that is, seem to prefer
the rules of the earlier jurists, which indicate that a father or grandfather can
compel a child into marriage, whether or not the child disavows the marriage at
puberty.160 Thus, the drafters had an opportunity to at least ameliorate some of the
concerns of liberals and their allies in the international human rights community
merely by replicating Sistani's rules and requiring the consent of the marrying
parties when they reach the age of adulthood. However, they chose to ignore
Sistani and use the rules of other jurists instead that prove even more problematic
from a liberal perspective.
As to why the drafters did this, the reasons seem clear enough. If the
aims of the law are to appeal to forces of social conservatism within Iraq, then it is
well established that child marriage is practiced in socially conservative
communities, and its prevalence has only risen in recent years.161 The fathers and
grandfathers in such communities would hardly want a court to entertain a claim
from their child upon reaching puberty that the child disavowed the marriage
contracted for the child. Hence, Sistani's comparatively progressive rule was
struck in favor of more conservative juristic approaches.
Such an approach is defensible as a realization of Shi'i rules, given the
juristic disagreement as between Sistani and other, leading jurists in the modern
era. However, the second change to the juristic rules is not. Specifically, the draft
Code omits any reference to a prohibition against penetrating a girl before she
reaches nine or attaching consequences if this is done. No jurist has failed to
mention this specific prohibition. There may be two reasons for this omission on
the part of the drafters. The first possibility is that the drafters feared some level
of backlash by including these rules. After all, if they are to indicate that
penetration of a six-year-old is a sin, they must also indicate that "thighing" her is
not one. Similarly, they must then describe the legal and financial consequences
151 Id.at arts. 43, 50, 51.
159 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3:¶60. See also supra notes 122-26 and accompanying
text.
160 See JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:172-73, 182; HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:433-34.
161 Iraq Woman Integrated Social and Health Survey, MINISTRY OF PLANNING,
CENTRAL STATISTICAL ORGANIZATION (March 2012), http://iraq.unfpa.org/en/publications/
docdownload/16-iraq-woman-integrated-social-and-health-survey-i-wish; See also
Gordon Brown, Child marriage could become law in Iraq, but it's a global scourge, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
apr/29/gordon-brown-child-marriage-iraq-barbaric.
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if there is in fact penetration that causes "ripping." This would call more
unwanted attention to the matter than merely omitting all of these rules might.
This explanation seems unlikely. If the drafters actually cared about
global opinion, they could have omitted any mention of child marriage as they
largely did with temporary marriage, or they could at least have rendered its
validity dependent on consent at adulthood, as Sistani does. The more likely
possibility is that the drafters thought that social conservatives might very well
wish to engage in sexual intercourse with five-year-old girls, and would naturally
not want significant financial consequences to attach to whatever followed by way
of permanent physical damage done to the girl. They thus sought to appease such
forces, at the expense of the girls so harmed.
This is of course supposition. What is clear is that whatever the reasons
for the omissions under the draft Code, a man can marry a girl of any age with her
father's consent, cause any amount of damage to her, and escape any financial
consequences. This is quite clearly a significant departure from core doctrinal
principles established by the jurists. The drafters are ignoring obligatory wealth
transfers, rendering prohibitions as permissible, and setting aside matters of right,
all in order to satisfy socially conservative forces. Whatever the Code might be, it
most certainly is not a faithful rendition of the rules of Shi'ism.
IV. REORDERING THE ISLAMIC LAW HIERARCHY: TRIBES OVER
JURISTS
The matters of both temporary marriage and child marriage involve
circumstances where the drafters of the Ja'fari Code chose to ignore particular
aspects of Islamic law that social conservatives did not like, while enacting those
aspects that appealed to them. The drafters did more than this however. They
also in some cases stripped the jurists of their authority to determine, on an
exclusive basis, the content of Islamic law for the Shi'a. This is deliciously ironic,
given that it was this authority that led to the objections to the existing Personal
Status Code in the first place.162 An excellent example lies in the case of
calculating the size of an estate upon death.
By way of background, the shari'a across Sunni and Shi'i schools does
not grant to individuals the right to distribute their assets upon death in any
manner they prefer. Instead, by operation of law, it mandates that the assets be
divided into specified portions to be given to designated individuals who are
usually family members, such as children, spouses, parents and siblings of both
genders.163 However, a decedent is given the ability to dispose of up to one-third
of his or her assets by bequest.164
162 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
163 JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 197 (3d ed. 2002).
164 Id
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In determining the size of the estate out of which one-third can be
bequeathed, Shi'i jurists included not only assets that the decedent acquired before
death, but also those acquired afterwards.165 A common example given in the
juristic texts is something that is caught in a net that the decedent had set up
before death but which was not caught until after death.166
Blood money is also included in the estate.167 Blood money is due to a
decedent if someone intentionally or accidentally kills or injures the decedent.1 68
Across the various Islamic schools and sects, the amount that is due varies
depending on the intent associated with the killing or injury, and the gender,
religion, and status of the victim.169 For example, within Shi'ism, intentionally
killing a free, 1 7 0 Muslim man requires the payment of either one hundred specified
171 172 173
high quality camels, two hundred cows, one thousand sheep, two hundred
fine garments each consisting of two shirts, 1 7 4 one thousand dinars (minted gold
coins), or ten thousand dirhams (minted silver coins).176 The deliberate
flexibility in forms of payment enables parties living in different areas to be able
to pay with items valued in their region.17 7  To give some rough sense of the
value, a dinar is approximately 75% of the weight of a mithqal of gold. Six and
165 SISTANI, supra note 51, at 2: ¶1381; KHu'I, supra note 68, at 2: ¶1015; HAKIM,
supra note 128, at 617-20.
166 SISTANI, supra note 51, at 2: ¶1381; KHu'I, supra note 68, at 2: ¶1015; HAKIM,
supra note 128, at 617.
167 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 28:290-92; SISTANI, supra note 51, at 2: ¶1381;
KHU'I, supra note 68, at 2: ¶1015; HAKIM, supra note 128, at 617.
168 The compendia indicate that all blood money that is paid whether for
intentional or accidental death, or for injury-are calculated in the estate. See JAWAHIR,
supra note 51, 28:290-91; SISTANI, supra note 51, at 2: ¶1381; KHU'I, supra note 68, at 2:
T1015; HAKIM, supra note 128, at 619-20; see generally JAWAHIR, supra note 51.
169 See PETERS, supra note 121, at 49-53 (setting forth the rules across the various
Islamic schools); JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:2-454 (laying out the Shi'i rules in
excruciating and often arcane detail). See also supra Part II.C.1.b.ii for an example where
blood money would be due to a child wife if a husband causes her severe injury during
sexual intercourse.
170 I have omitted the rules respecting blood money for slaves in the interests of
brevity. For further information on Islamic slavery, see infra Section V.A.
171 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 43:4; KHU'I, supra note 68, 3: ¶203.
172
173
174 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:4, 10 (taking the position that the garments have to
be from Yemen); KHU'I, supra note 68, at 3: ¶203 (arguing that the garments need not be
from Yemen).
175 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:11; KHU'L, supra note 68, at 3: T203.
176 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:4; KHU'L, supra note 68, at 3: T203.
177 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 8-9.
178 KHu'I, supra note 68, at 3: T203.
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two-thirds mithqal weighs an ounce.179 Thus, 1000 dinars are equal to 750
mithqal, which is about 112.5 ounces of gold. The price of gold has varied over
the past decade from about $1000 per ounce to $2000 per ounce,180 placing the
value of blood money owed for an intentional homicide between $112,000 and
$224,000. When one accidentally kills the decedent, whether negligently or not,
one must pay the same amount. However, if the blood price is paid in camels, the
quality of the camels is lower. 8 1 In each case, the blood price of a woman is half
of that of an equivalent man.182 A schedule is set for the blood money due for an
intentional and unintentional injury to an organ. For example, each eye and ear is
worth half of a full blood price, 8 3 whereas a tongue or a nose is worth the full
blood price.1 84
The main difference between intentional and unintentional killing and
injury is the absence of an option for retribution when there is no intent. 85 In
other words, with an intentional killing or injury, a victim (or a decedent's
representatives) may demand retribution by inflicting the same injury on the
perpetrator, rather than receiving blood money. To quote the Jawahir:
[Retribution] means here the satisfaction of the effect of the
crime, whether it be killing, severing, striking or injuring. The
one seeking retribution mimics the effect of the crime, and does
the same to him.1 86
Thus, a Muslim man could cut the tongue of another Muslim man who cut his.
Similarly, a Muslim woman could cut the tongue of a Muslim man who
179 Marion Johnson, The Nineteenth Century Gold 'Mithqal' in West and North
Africa, 9 J. OF AFR. HIST. 547, 548 (1968).
Iso Tables are readily available on the Internet that reflect the price of gold over the
past five years or longer. See, e.g., GOLDPRICE, www.goldprice.org (last visited Mar. 26,
2016).
181 KHU'I, supra note 68, at 3: TT 209-10. There is an intermediate form of intent,
roughly equivalent to recklessness, which I do not discuss in the main text. Suffice it to
say, the blood money is basically the same for such reckless killing as it would be for
intentional and unintentional killings as per above, though if paid in camels, the quality of
the camels lies between the high quality camels due for an intentional killing, and the
somewhat lower quality camels due for an unintentional one. See JAWAHIR, supra note 51,
43:17-18.
182 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:32 (respecting Muslim women), 39 (respecting
non-Muslim women); KHU'I, supra note 68, at 3: ¶213 (respecting Muslim women), at
¶215 (respecting non-Muslim women).
183 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:181, 200; KHU'I, supra note 68, at 3: ¶¶279, 283.
184 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:190, 209; KHU'I, supra note 68, at 3: ¶282.
185 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 43:3; KHU'I, supra note 68, at 3: ¶226.
186 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 42:7.
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intentionally cut hers, but she would have to pay half of the blood price first to
make up for the difference in blood money between her and the perpetrator. 8 7
There are obvious human rights concerns associated with these rules, but
considerably comforting to liberal and secular forces within Iraq is that fact that
these rules bear no resemblance to the manner in which such matters are
addressed as a matter of fact. Rather, there are two effective systems to deal with
intentional and unintentional injury in Iraq. The first is the state's legal system,
and the second is the tribal law. 8 8
The former is broadly relevant as concerns the application of criminal
law, and it is the product of Western transplant, not shari'a.189 There is thus no
such thing as a retributive injury elected by a victim in the Penal Code. The state
can pursue the death penalty for murder, but if it does not, then a jail term is the
alternative. 190 Similarly, for other injuries, the punishments are jails and fines, not
the amputation of limbs and the severing of bodily organs.1 91
Concerning compensation for an injury, Iraq has developed an entire tort
system that entitles a victim to compensation for material and nonmaterial harm
that another person caused them through a "fault" on the part of the perpetrator.192
Fault is explicitly limited to circumstances where the perpetrator intends the
injury, or negligently causes it.193 When the resulting injury is death, then the
victim's estate may recover for any material harm suffered by the victim, and the
victim's family may recover for emotional harm and mental distress as well. 194
The goal is thus to compensate for harm actually incurred. 1 95 Given this, the idea
that somehow the amount of recovery would be based on gender, or that an injury
to a nose would be compensated at the same level as a wrongful death, runs
contrary to the very logic of the system, which compensates based on actual harm,
not what body part has been damaged.
This means of addressing injuries to the person, complete with elements
of causation,196 the standard of the reasonable person for negligence,197 and the
notion of recovery for emotional distress and mental anguish,198 would be familiar
1 KHu'I, supra note 68, 3: ¶162 (giving the example of a severed hand).
188 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind: Legal Pluralism and the
Rule of Law in THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW MOVEMENT: A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY
AND THE WAY FORWARD 135, 148-54 (2014).
189 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Religious Minorities and Shari'a in Iraqi Courts, 31 B.U.
Int'l L.J. 387, 403 (2013).
190 Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, arts. 405-06 (Iraq).
191 Id. at arts. 412-13.
192 Civil Code No. 40 of 1951 (Iraq), arts. 202-05.
193 Abdul Majid al-Hakim, A Summary of the Theory of Obligation in the Iraqi Civil
Code 1:215 (1980).
194 Civil Code No. 40 of 1951 (Iraq), arts. 203, 205.
195 HAKIM, supra note 128, at 1:201.
196 Id. at 1:239-40.
197 Id. at 1:215.
198 Id. at 1:212.
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to any modem civilian or common law lawyer, even as it is entirely alien to the
jurists of Najaf. And it has been the state's formal means of adjudicating disputes
since the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1951. Countless numbers of cases are
decided annually on the basis of this standard.1 99
The other manner in which injuries are addressed within Iraq is through
use of the tribal law. This system is not used to punish wrongdoers (though blood
feuds can erupt),200 so much as ensure that victims are compensated for their
injuries. The processes begin with an informal notification initiated by one tribe
to a second, effectively informing them that in its view, a member of the second
tribe has caused injury to one of the first.201 If that does not satisfy the injured
tribe, then it makes a formal, sterner demand, known among the Iraqi tribes as a
guama,202 in public view, both to shame the other tribe into negotiating a
resolution and to warn of future sanctions should the tribe continue to refuse. 203
Most tribes against which a guama is initiated seek resolution soon thereafter if
204they think one of their members is indeed responsible for an injury2. This is
because a tribe against which a claim is made is well aware that it might have a
claim to make in the future, and hence there is little advantage in developing a
reputation for recalcitrance.205 In the minority of cases where there is no
agreement to resolve, the matter is escalated to what is known as the degga,206
which involves spraying the house of the perpetrator with bullets when nobody is
207
expected to be home2. Much like the guama, this serves both as reputational
sanction (as the bullet holes are rather obvious to any onlooker) and as a warning
of further repercussions, albeit in a far more confrontational fashion than the
guama.208 The degga can be repeated any number of times, with increasing levels
of threatened violence.2 09
At some point during this process, one of three outcomes will ensue. The
injured party might relent. This is unusual. However, it could occur if the
allegedly offending party demands an arbitration of the matter, and the parties
agree on an arbitrator who finds that the injury is not the responsibility of the
199 Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind, supra note 188, at 151.
200 Hamoudi, Al-Sharaa & Al-Dahan, supra note 109, at 250 (noting a rather
widespread blood feud that erupted in Basra in 2010 between two rival tribes).
201 Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind, supra note 188, at 151.
202 The word is an Iraqi dialecticalform of the classical Arabic verb qawama, which
means to resist or to combat. The idea is that the offended tribe is fighting back, in a sense,
against the wrong done to it. HANS WEHR, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC
934 (J. Milton Cowan ed., 4th ed. 1994).
203 Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind, supra notel88, at 152.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 This term is an Iraqi dialectical form of the classical Arabic verb daqqa, meaning
to pound, strike or beat. WEHR, supra note 202, at 331.
207 Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind, supra note 188, at 152.
208 Hamoudi, Alsharaa & al-Dahan, supra note 109, at 235.
209 Id. at 15; Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind, supra note 188, at 152.
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allegedly offending party.210 The second possibility is that a full-fledged feud
develops between the tribes. Parties normally avoid this option because it results
in levels of violence that can attract state attention.211 Finally, the offending tribe
212
can relent, and request a respite, or atwa, to gather its members2. Following this,
the offending tribe pays a visit to the home of the injured member of the other
213tribe to discuss compensation. These discussions, to the extent they involve a
lost life, refer to the blood money that injured parties can demand, usually in the
form of sheep.2 14 Eventually, after much pleading and discussion, the tribes settle
215
on a sum, which is usually paid immediately in cash2. In more remote areas, the
settlement can involve the trading of women as well, where a woman from one
tribe is delivered to another to compensate for an injury done to it.216
This is but a summary rendition of the rich and complex area of Iraqi
tribal dispute resolution, but it is sufficient to demonstrate important differences
from the Islamic law of homicide and wounding. Nonphysical, moral injuries,
like defamation or slander, are quite commonly those for which tribes demand
compensation, given the importance of preserving honor among them.2 17 By
contrast, the Shi'i jurists make no mention of such nonphysical injuries, nor does
the system they have created seem to allow space for them, given the lack of any
sense in inflicting a retributive injury or ascribing a "blood price" to reputation, as
opposed to an organ or a limb. In addition, many types of settlement, including
the trading of women, have no Islamic analogue. A perpetrator may pay blood
money in any of a number of forms under the Shi'i rules, but the offering of
218
women for marriage is not one of them. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the looming threat under which the negotiations take place in Islamic law is the
exacting of physical retribution, at least for intentional harms,2 1 9 and not the
reputational sanctions that appear to motivate the tribe.220
It is just as important to note that within Iraq, there is no significant
social or political movement that seems interested in implementing the Islamic
210 Hamoudi, Al-Sharaa, & Al-Dahhan, supra note 110, at 22; see also Hamoudi,
Decolonizing the Centralist Mind, supra note 188, at 151-52.
211 Hamoudi, Al-Sharaa, & Al-Dahhan, supra note 109, at 27.
212 Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind, supra note 188, at 152.
213 Hamoudi, Al-Sharaa, & Al-Dahan, supra note 109, at 238.
214 Interview with Sheikh Mazen Falih Muhammad al-'Araiby, clan elder of the
Muhammadawi tribe, in Sadr City, Iraq (April 25, 2013).
215 Hamoudi, Al-Sharaa & Al-Dahhan, supra note 109, at 238-39.
216 Id. at 27.
217 See id. at 22 (pointing out that slander is one area that tribes insist they address
entirely on their own, without, state court involvement).
218 See supra notes 168-85 and accompanying text (describing different mediums
that can be used to pay blood money due).
219 See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text (describing retributive injuries).
220 Hamoudi, Al-Sharaa & Al-Dahhan, supra note 109, at 14-15 (noting importance
of reputation among tribes).
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system concerning homicide and physical injury to the person.221 Liberals and
secularists who live overwhelmingly in the large cities obviously prefer the
existing transplanted state system. The tribes that make up an important part of
the socially conservative constituency in urban shantytowns and rural areas
throughout Iraq222 likewise have no interest in an Islamic state system. If they did,
they would already be implementing an Islamic system on their own rather than
relying on tribal law.
The drafters of the Ja'fari Personal Status Code thus had three options.
The first, which would be the way of Islamic purity, would be to include blood
money in the value of an estate, and then leave to future legislators the task of
reforming tort law to define what blood money is and how to calculate it. Another
way would be to placate liberals by simply indicating that the value of the estate
includes wealth acquired by the decedent after death, including any amounts
accruing to the decedent by virtue of someone causing the decedent's death. This
would hardly be endorsing the current state system for determining redress for
injury. After all, the amounts referred to as arising out of murder or accidental
killing could be blood money just as easily as they could be ordinary damages for
wrongful death. But, at least such a provision would recognize state law enough
as to permit a person to bequeath amounts that the estate receives after death
through the adjudication or settlement of a modem tort claim.
Yet as we have seen time and time again, the draft Code was not meant
to placate liberals, nor was it drafted to actually implement Islamic law in any
recognizably "pure" form. Rather, it was designed to satisfy socially conservative
elements of Iraqi society. Therefore, the drafters opted for a different course.
This was to defer to the tribes in their determinations of the proper understanding
of Islamic law, to the derogation of the jurists. That is, the Code refused to
recognize state law rules on wrongful death while simultaneously declaring tribal
law as Islamic, despite its differences from Islamic law as articulated by the Najaf
jurists. Specifically, Article 25 reads as follows:
The estate is calculated by what the person owned at his death,
but what enters into his possession after death does not count,
with the exception of the blood money for a mistaken or
intentional killing, if the representatives of the decedent
reconcile themselves to that. Within this is the tribal resolution,
223given that it is part of the blood money.
This changes the juristic rules in two important ways. First, it generally excludes
sums that would have accrued to the estate under juristic rules, such as the fish
221 The Death of Islamic Law, supra note 32, at 327.
222 HUSSEIN D. HASSAN, IRAQ: TRIBAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES, CRS-1 (CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22626, 2008).
223 Draft Ja'fari Code, supra note 42, at art. 25.
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caught after the death of the decedent in a trap the decedent had set.224 The effect
of this is that if the state awarded compensation for wrongful death to a person, a
court would not give effect to any a priori effort by that decedent to bequeath
such funds. Perhaps the drafters found this appropriate because funds awarded for
wrongful death by an Iraqi court applying a modem Civil Code are not Islamic in
origin and thus deserve no recognition in a Shi'i Personal Status Code. As the
drafters could not change the Civil Code, they merely changed the rule to render
such sums unrecoverable, thereby arguably retaining the substance of the juristic
rule, if not the form.
Yet, ironically, the drafters did not treat tribal resolutions the same way
as state law judgments for wrongful death adjudicated under a more secular Civil
Code, even though both are deviations from Islamic law. Instead, they declared
tribal resolutions to be themselves the realization of Islamic principles respecting
recovery of blood money. No qualification is given to this. In other words, the
compensation awarded in a tribal resolution is by legal definition the payment of
Islamic "blood money," even if it includes amounts that no jurist would ever
describe as Islamic, and even if the tribal resolution is reached using processes
that jurists would not recognize as Islamic. The tribes thus have as much right as
the jurists to determine the content of Islamic law.
For a Code specifically drafted to realize the right of the jurists to set the
law of personal status for the Shi'a, this is truly remarkable. It appears that the
problem for the drafters of the Code with the existing Personal Status Code was
not that it granted the power to determine the content of Islamic law to individuals
other than the jurists. The draft Code does that as well. The problem instead is
that it gave such power to the wrong people-specifically, progressives, rather
than tribes intent on preserving existing hierarchies and structural iniquities.
V. STRATEGIC JURISTIC OMISSION
A. On Islamic Slavery and the Nature of Juristic Omission
This Article so far has focused on the means by which Iraqi lawmakers
drafting a personal status code altered religious rules to meet the expectations of
socially conservative forces whose claim of fealty to those same rules was more
rhetorical than real. Yet it is not only purely political figures, such as lawmakers,
who manipulate and prevaricate in order to change the substance of religious rules
in order to comply with the demands of a constituency. Jurists do much of the
same, as this Part will show.
It is important to distinguish this phenomenon from a juristic
reassessment of the shari'a corpus that either explicitly or implicitly rejects,
limits, or alters earlier rules based on alternative readings of source text. Such a
224 See supra note 169 and accompanying text (describing rule and juristic support
for it).
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reassessment would simply be doctrinal evolution, no different from changes in
constitutional understanding that occur in high courts around the world over the
225
span of decades2. Indeed, this Article points to one prominent example where
such a reassessment appears to have taken place. Sistani suggests, in a manner
that earlier prominent jurists did not suggest,226 that there is doubt as to the
validity of a marriage arranged for a girl by her father if she disavows it at
227puberty. While Sistani does not explain the basis for his position or its variance
with earlier determinations, the change is unmistakable.
That said, at least from the standpoint of a liberal, over the past two
centuries, jurists have been broadly unwilling to undertake a serious and thorough
examination of the rules they have derived, with the deplorable results described
228
above relating to matters such as child marriage and the reduction of marriage
229to bartering over sexual access. Instead, quite often, rather than revisit
particularly unattractive rules, they leave them not discussed. The jurist does not
change the previous rule so much as reduce treatment of it in a fashion that almost
misrepresents it. Alternatively, the jurist might just not discuss the rule at all,
thereby leading the faithful who do not spend time reading compendia decades old
unaware that such a rule could ever have existed within Shi'ism. I refer to these
processes as "strategic juristic omission."
The most obvious example of this is slavery. The juristic compendia of
all of the major jurists of Najaf through Grand Ayatollah Khu'i, Sistani's
immediate predecessor, go into great detail in their treatment of marriage on the
230
rules respecting marriage to, and intercourse with, female slaves. Hence, where
Sistani speaks in the passage set forth in Part III.B as marriage231 being "of two
225 Hence, for example, Barry Friedman indicates that in its rulings across two
centuries, the Supreme Court has largely adopted constitutional understandings that
conform to popular expectations, and that its legitimacy has suffered when it has failed to
do so. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC INFLUENCE HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-15
(Farrar et. al. eds., 2009).
226 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 29:172-73, 182; HAKIM, supra note 128, 14:433-34.
227 SISTANI, supra note 51, at 3: ¶60.
228 See supra Part II.C.i.
229 See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
230 It is important to note that slavery historically appears in far more sections than
the book of marriage. There is an entire section, or "book," devoted to manumission, for
example. See generally, e.g., JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 34:86-193. Even more prominently,
the Book of Sale in almost any Sunni or Shi'i juristic compendium written prior to the
twentieth century contains extensive rules respecting the purchase or sale of human beings.
See ALI, supra note 6, at 7 (pointing out the usefulness to medieval jurists of using slaves as
examples in commercial transactions). As these bear less direct of a connection to matters
of personal status, I do not discuss them in the main text.
231 Supra note 101 and accompanying text. The term I have translated here as "licit
sexual intercourse" is nikah, which is the same word Sistani uses and which I refer to
generally as "marriage." The translation of nikah as marriage is largely accurate but an
important nuance arises in the context of slavery. Specifically, nikah can include
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types," Khu'i instead lists three types of licit sexual intercourse.23 In addition to
permanent marriage and temporary marriages, there is also "the ownership of the
233
right hand," meaning intercourse with slaves2. An entire section follows shortly
thereafter entitled "on the permissibility of enjoying female slaves and licit sexual
intercourse with them." 2 3 4 This is in addition to countless other references to
slavery and personal status within the compendium, from the inability of an owner
of two female slaves who are sisters to enjoy intercourse with both of them so
long as he continues to own both235 to rules concerning the attribution of children
of slaves to their masters under circumstances where the slave has (unlawfully)
endured intercourse with more than one man.23 6 Khu'i's treatment is common;
nearly every Shi'i juristic text prior to his contains broad and extensive rules
concerning when a slave may be married, when she may be "enjoyed" and the
rules and conditions for each.2 3 7
Sistani's texts lack all such references, containing rules only as they
concern free people. Is this then an implicit rebuke to Khu'i, and a rejection of the
longstanding rules within the shari'a concerning marriage and slavery? It would
certainly be encouraging to think so. However, Sistani appears to be doing
something else. He seems to want neither to cast aside the extensive and thorough
rules of slavery set forth by his predecessors, nor to repeat them given both their
irrelevance and their potential for subjecting him, and the clerical academies
generally, to criticism for endorsing a practice broadly regarded as abhorrent in
the modem era among liberals and conservatives alike.
He thus indicates he will not address slavery, but does so in a notably
oblique fashion. Following a rule in which he declares the birth control practice
of withdrawal as permissible, if reprehensible, the following footnote appears:
This is the rule for a free woman, but for a female slave
withdrawal from her is permitted absolutely, and without it
being reprehensible. It should be noted that the subject of the
rules mentioned in this book are for free men and women. As
for the male and female slave, they differ from this in some of
their rulings. We have omitted-for the most part-laying out
238their rules because we are not afflicted with it in this era.
permissible forms of intercourse beyond those of permanent and temporary marriage, and
in particular sex with female slaves. Hence, in this specific context alone, I refer to nikah
as "licit sexual intercourse" rather than "marriage" even though ordinarily, and certainly in
modern parlance, it is understood to be virtually synonymous with marriage.
232 KHI', supra note 68, at 2:257.
233 Id
234 Id. at T1320-40.
235 Id. at T1255.
236 Id. at ¶1374.
237 See, e.g., HAKIM, supra note 128, at 14:278-367 (containing extensive rules of
marriage as they pertain to slaves); JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 30:202-314.
238 SISTANI, supra note 51, at 3: ¶10 n. 1.
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There are several matters of significance to note. The first is that of all places to
include the reference to the omission of slavery, this is possibly among the most
obscure. The more logical place would be later, when discussing the three types
of licit sexual intercourse that exist within the juristic rules. This seems an effort
to bury the information.
Second, even if a person finds the footnote, they are unlikely to pay it
much heed. A seminary student attached to juristic tradition is led to think this is
a mere nod to practicality. By contrast, it will mean nothing to a social
conservative for whom slavery is not a current practice, and even a critic might
only glance at the information without much thought. The permissibility of sex
with the slave is oblique, after all, and only in the context of a relatively harmless
rule relating primarily to birth control.
Finally, while Sistani's purported explanation for omitting the rules
concerning the "enjoyment" of female slaves may seem defensible at first glance,
in fact in broader context it hardly seems so. After all, the marriage of six-year-
olds has been illegal in Iraq for decades as well under the existing Personal Status
239Code, and yet Sistani mentions the rules respecting that practice in ample detail.
In addition, Sistani's rules concerning the payment of blood money are not
recognized in Iraqi law either, and yet again, he continues to mention them, and
the drafters of the Ja'fari Code replicate that rather than dismiss it as irrelevant in
our times.240 Sistani even has a rule permitting a woman to invalidate her
marriage to a husband if, after she contracts it, she learns that he has been
241
castrated2. In a world of harems and eunuchs, this may have been relevant, but it
is hard to believe that this happens with any frequency today at all. If the
touchstone for what is and is not to be mentioned in the juristic rules is purely
relevance, then there is much that requires excision.
Rather, Sistani seems to be engaging in strategic juristic omission. In
other words, he is deferring to the expectations of his constituency in what he
chooses to mention and to omit. As noted above, child marriage exists in Iraq
within Shi'i conservative communities. If Sistani refused to discuss it on the
grounds that marriage of minors is a matter with which we are "not afflicted" in
this era, it would be both counterfactual and harmful to his status as Najaf's
premier jurist. It would seem to privilege Iraqi law over Shi'i practice in a manner
that many conservative Shi'a might find objectionable. By contrast, because the
239 Compare SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8 (indicating no intercourse with girls under
nine); ¶59 (granting father and paternal grandfather the power to contract marriage for a
minor) with Personal Status Code No. 188 of 1959 (Iraq) at arts. 7 ("The conditions for
competency to marry are sanity and the completion of eighteen years") and 9(1) ("No
relative or anyone else has the right to force any person, male or female, to marry without
their permission.").
240 See supra note 226 and accompanying text (quoting the draft Code's references
to blood money).
241 SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶268(2).
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modem principles underlying the abolition of slavery have largely been
242internalized across the Iraqi political spectrum, the deference to Iraqi law in its
abolition of slavery is sensible. It meets with no objections among Sistani's core
conservative constituency, and avoids miring him in matters that could lead to
broad international condemnation.
When the matter is slavery, it is nearly impossible for a Grand Ayatollah
to be anything but explicit in noting omissions. The rules on sex with slaves are
243too extensively laid out, in far too much detail, and over too many sources, to
be able to exclude them without some sort of explanation. To pretend they do not
exist would strain the credulity of anyone even faintly familiar with juristic texts.
In other cases, the discrepancies are subtle enough that it is hard to know
whether what is taking place is strategic juristic omission, as with slavery, or the
reaching of a different conclusion concerning the source text, as with Sistani's
244
rules concerning the right of a girl to disavow a marriage at puberty2. It is not
clear, for example, whether Grand Ayatollahs Khu'i and Sistani disagree with an
earlier primus inter pares Grand Ayatollah of Najaf, Muhsin al-Hakim, in his
determination that it is recommended to imprison a wife in her home, so that she
245does not leave except when necessary. Neither recounts the rule, nor do they
recount Hakim's stated recommendation that there be haste in setting a marriage
for a woman once she does reach the age of nine because it is better for a girl not
246to menstruate in her father's home2. This may reflect strategic omission, and
there would be good reason for it. After all, very devout women do frequently
leave the home in modem Iraq. Indeed the much-heralded sister of one prominent
cleric spent a great deal of time promoting modem Islamist notions among women
and lost her life in 1980 because of it.247 It is one thing to indicate she requires her
248husband's permission to do this, as Sistani and Khu'i both do2. It is quite
another to say it is preferable that she remain locked in her home, as Hakim
249does2. Similarly, while some Iraqis do marry their daughters at nine, a good
many do not, and would not appreciate being told it would be favored if they did.
242 Freamon properly notes that there is a broad condemnation of the practice of
slavery in contemporary Muslim societies. Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, and
the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 7 (1998).
As Freamon noted then, and as is even truer now, there is some number of groups who
continue to engage in and defend the practice of slavery, but the consensus remains firmly
against the practice. See id. at 5-6.
243 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (referring to Sistani's rule and its
variance from existing juristic precedent).
245 HAKIMI, supra note 128, at 14:11.
246 Id.
247 Joyce Wiley, Alima Bint al-Huda: Women's Advocate, in THE MOST LEARNED OF
THE SHI'A: THE INSTITUTION OF MARJA' TAQLID 149-50, 157 (Walbridge ed. 2001).
248 See SISTANI, supra note 51, at 3: ¶337; KHu'i, supra note 68, at 2: ¶1407.
249 HAKIM, supra note 128, at 14:11.
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At the same time, these positions are not so deeply and broadly
established in Shi'i texts that one could discount the possibility that Sistani and
Khu'i reached different legal conclusions from that of Hakim rather than
exercised strategic juristic omission. That those conclusions could have been
driven by the social and political circumstances described in the previous
paragraph is obvious, but nevertheless, they would hardly be an example of
strategic juristic omission if they were indeed the result of a different
interpretation of authoritative texts.
The most interesting cases, however, lie between the poles of slavery on
the one hand, where omission is necessarily explicit, and recommendations
respecting the imprisonment of wives on the other, where there may not even be
omission so much as doctrinal evolution. These are the cases where the source
material is extensive enough that one would expect overt treatment of a subject
that the jurist is ignoring, but not so extensive that the jurist is forced to
acknowledge the fact that he has omitted a longstanding rule. The resulting
silence is a form of deference to modem socially conservative expectations, even
at the expense of altering contemporary understandings of the firmly established
doctrine. However, it is done in an indirect manner that avoids the jurist having to
explain the basis for his actions. An excellent example of this concerns the
subject of female genital mutilation, as described further below.
B. On Strategic Juristic Omission and Female Genital Mutilation
Female genital mutilation has significant pedigree within historic Shi'i
doctrine. A reasonably extensive treatment of the subject can be found in the
Jawahir, as follows:
As for females, it is referred to among the companions as "the
curtailing of the maidens" and it is "recommended" without
disagreement. To the contrary, the consensus supports it, and
the [original] sources are plentiful or incontrovertible, and
present the matter in its entirety. It is not required for the
guardian [to do] before puberty, nor incumbent upon [the
maidens] after it. The manifest opinion is that the time for them
is seven years [after adulthood; i.e. the age of 16]. Indeed based
on the report of Giyath ibn Ibrahim from Ja'far ibn Muhammad
[al-Sadiq] from his father [Muhammad al-Baqir], peace be upon
the latter two of them, "do not curtail the maiden until she is an
adult seven years."
It is required not to uproot it in its entirety. From the Sahih of
Ibn Muslim, from Abi Abdillah (peace be upon him), when the
women emigrated to the Apostle of God (peace be upon him), a
woman emigrated with them who was called "Um Habeeb," and
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she was a curtailer, who curtailed maidens. When the Apostle
of God, peace be upon him, saw her, he [peace be upon him]
said to her, "Um Habeeb, the work that you used to do, do you
do it now?" She said to him [peace be upon him], "Yes, Apostle
of God, unless it is forbidden, and you tell me to avoid it." So
he said, "No, it is permissible. Come near me, so I may teach
you." She neared him, and he said, "Um Habeeb, if you do it,
then do not destroy and do not remove entirely, but mark it, for
this brightens the face and is more pleasurable for the husband."
"And" in any event what is clear from what we have mentioned
is that "if an uncircumcised nonbeliever becomes a Muslim, he
must circumcise" himself "if he was of old age.... and" it is
clear also that "if a woman becomes a Muslim" then "she is not
obligated to be circumcised" but that is "recommended" for her.
In the report of Abi Basir, "I asked the father of Ja'far, peace be
upon him, about the maiden who comes from the land of
polytheism and she becomes Muslim, and she asks for one to
curtail her, but she is unable to find a woman [to do it], so he
said, 'The Sunna [i.e. the practice of the Prophet and the Imams]
for circumcision is for men, and not for women."'
2 5 0
This is the main passage that addresses the question of female genital
mutilation in a compendium that spans 43 volumes. Thus, unlike slavery, the
references to it are not extensive in the historic juristic texts, nor are they repeated
with frequency. That said, the passage is detailed enough to make clear that the
traditional juristic position in favor of female genital mutilation is a reasonably
well established one. It appears, after all, in one of the most influential compendia
of the nineteenth century, which is the subject of intense study in the seminaries of
Najaf today and which is itself an extended commentary of one of the most
influential juristic works in the history of Shi'ism, the thirteenth century Shara 'i
252
al-Islam of Muhaqqaq al-Hilli. Moreover, the passage describes the original
source material upon which the opinion is based as at the very least "plentiful"
(mustafidha) if not so well established as to be "incontrovertible" (mutawatir).253
250 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 31:262-63 (emphasis and quotation marks retained
from Al-Hilli's original text, discussed infra).
251 See ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, THE JUST RULER IN SHI'ITE ISLAM: THE
COMPREHENSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE JURIST IN IMAMITE JURISPRUDENCE 22 (1988)
(describing the influence of the Jawahir). For a less sober and academic account, one
popular website describes the Jawahir as "an indispensable companion of every [jurist]
worth any name, since each line in it requires profound pondering and elucidation [sic]."
Allamah Shaikh Muhammad Hasan Najafi 'Sahib-e-Jawahir,' IMAM REZA NETWORK,
http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=6934 (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
252 SACHEDINA, supra note 251, at 14.
253 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, 31:262.
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It does not obligate women to have their genitalia mutilated, but it does indicate
254that to do so would be a religiously recommended act.
At the same time, the practice of female genital mutilation is extremely
255
rare, if not entirely absent, amongst the Arab Shi'a in Iraq. There is no
256
expectation for women to undergo the procedure2. To demand something so
alien, or even to recommend it, is to risk alienating an important constituency that
regards juristic dictates as important.
It therefore comes as little surprise that modem jurists do not call
attention to the historic rule respecting female genital mutilation, and indeed have
begun to engage in strategic juristic omission with respect to it. They have not, to
reemphasize the point, reexamined the source material to challenge the
conclusions of the 19th century Jawahir, nor those of Muhaqqiq al-Hilli upon
which it is based. Nowhere do they challenge, for example, the conclusion of the
Jawahir that the original source material leads to an "incontrovertible" conclusion
recommending female genital mutilation, nor do they offer a different
understanding of precisely what the Prophet Muhammad was saying to Umm
Habeeb, and what lessons might be drawn from it. Such approaches might be
eminently plausible, to be clear, but those are the methods of the liberal and the
reformer, not those of the traditionalist seminaries who currently pronounce Shi'i
doctrine. Instead, the authorities over time reduced the rule, and ultimately
stopped referring to it entirely, without at any point in the process ever
challenging its legitimacy.
The process of reduction, and indeed prevarication, begins with Grand
Ayatollah Khu'i. His compendium reflects the rule, but in so reduced a form that
it effectively changes its meaning. Khu'i specifically states as follows:
It is recommended to wash the newborn and read the call to
prayer in his right ear, and the preparation for prayer ('iqama) in
the left, to place the earth of Husayn, peace be upon him, in his
257
mouth, mixed with the water of the Euphrates, and name him
with a name of one of the Prophets or Imams, peace be upon
them, and giving him a nickname (but not to nickname a
Muhammad with "Abi Qasim),258 to shave his head on the
254 Id.
255 Ian Black & Fazel Hawramy, ISIS Denies Ordering That All Girls in Mosul
Undergo FGM, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2014) (quoting an Iraqi newspaper to the effect
that "the practice of FGM is alien to Iraqi society except the Kurdish provinces").
256 See id. (noting total absence of FGM in Iraq outside of the Kurdish areas).
257 Perhaps the central legend around which Shi'ism is based is the death of Husayn
bin Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, in the plains known today as Kerbala
along the banks of the Euphrates River. MOMEN, supra note 47, at 30-31. Hence the
juristic rule that recommends that a child upon birth first taste the earth of Kerbala, mixed
with the water of the Euphrates.
258 The Prophet Muhammad is referred to as "Abi Qasim," or father of Qasim,
because this was the name of his first born son. TARIQ RAMADAN, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE
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seventh day, and a celebration afterwards, to give as charity the
weight of his hair in gold or silver, to pierce his ear and
circumcise him, and circumcision is obligatory after puberty if
he has not been circumcised earlier. The curtailing of the
maidens is recommended, even if they reach adulthood, but the
259preference is seven years after their adulthood.
In the first place, it is quite notable that as with Sistani in his rules
respecting slavery,260 Khu'i clearly attempts not to bring very much attention to
this rule respecting the mutilation of female genitalia. It is buried in a series of
other rules, most of which plainly pertain exclusively to boys, such as
circumcision on the seventh day, and naming the child with the name of a Prophet
or Imam. It is only at the end of this litany of recommended acts that Khu'i makes
reference to the "curtailment of the maidens."
The reduction of the broader treatment in the Jawahir is also interesting
because the term used for "maidens" (jawari in Arabic) could also very likely
261
mean "slave girls," as it commonly does2. Clearly the term does not always
mean that. Section JJ.B above includes a passage of a temporary marriage to a
"maiden" who demands a dower in advance, and as slaves could not marry
without permission of their master, the implication appears to be that she is free.
More importantly, the "curtailment" is plainly not restricted to female
slaves in the Jawahir. Indeed, the passage itself refers to the "circumcision" of
females262 (after similar passages relating to the circumcision of males),263 and
indicates that this practice of "female circumcision" has been referred to
historically as "curtailment of the maidens." The final paragraph, respecting
female genital mutilation for a converted Muslim, refers specifically to it being
264
recommended for "a woman" (mar'a) but not required2. An earlier passage
indicates the circumcision of men as being obligatory because it was a tradition of
the Prophet, while the "circumcision" of "women" (nisa') is merely "noble" and
265therefore recommended rather than required.
Yet reviewing Khu'i's considerably reduced rules alone without the
benefit such careful, extended treatment hardly leaves the same impression. The
matter might very well seem to have something to do with female slaves, but not
free women. After all, Khu'i does set out the rules concerning female slaves in
PROPHET: LESSONS FROM THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD 219 n.8 (2007). As a result, the
nickname is deemed inappropriate for a person named Muhammad according to Khu'i.
259 KHu'I, supra note 68, ¶1372.
260 See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
261 Hence, for example, Khu'i refers elsewhere to obligations on a person who
"purchases a maiden." KHU'I, supra note 68, ¶1336.
262 JAWAHIR, supra note 51, at 31:262. The specific term is anath, which
unmistakably refers to all females.
263 Id. at 31:260-62.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 261.
379
380 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 33, No. 2 2016
some level of detail, and this could be considered a more extended part of that
266
analysis2. The term used for "female slave" ('ama) is different than the word
"maiden" used in the context of "curtailment," but one not predisposed to believe
that Shi'ism endorses the mutilation of female genitals might not dwell long on
the curious discrepancy.
Several decades later, Khu'i's successor as primus inter pares in Najaf,
Grand Ayatollah Sistani, removed all mention of curtailment of the maidens. This
might lead a reader to confirm in their mind that indeed the recommendation in
favor of female genital mutilation related only to slave girls. After all, as
discussed above, Sistani explicitly states that he will not discuss slavery given its
lack of relevance.267 That earlier, authoritative jurists had found it near
incontrovertible that mutilating the genitalia of all females was recommended at
the age of sixteen is then left well-disguised. In fact, it is so well disguised that
few to none of the socially conservative Shi'a dominating Iraq's south would have
any reason to know the actual rule, which reflects values that clearly are not
present in their own society.268
Of course, any legislator has a very easy time conforming a draft law
such as the Ja'fari Personal Status Code to modem, socially conservative
expectations in cases of strategic juristic omission. The legislator need only
follow the lead of the jurist who has already done the work of masking parts of the
doctrine to meet social demands. All references to slavery can be omitted, as well
as recommendations to imprison women and mutilate their genitals. If anyone
were to ask precisely why the legislator had done this, the legislator need only
hand the person making the objection a copy of Sistani's compendium and ask
where such rules appear such that they require recognition in law. The mask thus
works, and the distortion necessary to conform traditional rules to conservative
expectations is complete.
It is therefore of little to no surprise that the draft Code does not
recommend genital mutilation and omits all rules concerning the enjoyment of
female slaves. That does nothing, however, to evade the central fact that such
rules are very much part of the Shi'i tradition. If the drafters truly wanted a Code
that would replicate the tradition, as was claimed, such rules should be present. A
jurist finding it prudent not to talk about such matters is hardly a reason to ignore
them in light of the supposed overarching goal of the law. If, however, the real
aim of the draft has nothing to do with realizing traditional rules, but instead is an
effort to enact something that meets with the expectations and desires of Muslim
social conservatives, then of course there is much advantage in using the juristic
cover already provided.
266 KHu'I, supra note 68, ¶1320-40.
267 See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
268 See Black & Hawramy, supra note 255.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the perceived equivalence between social
conservatism in the Muslim world and adherence to traditional religious rules is a
false one. The point is not that social conservatives ignore religious rules entirely,
any more than liberals do. Rather, they apply such rules selectively, manipulating
and reformulating them in a process and in a manner that suits a preexisting
ideological vision that seeks the preservation of existing social hierarchies and
authorities. This is not terribly different in the end from the methods of the
liberal, even if the liberal's aims involve the realization of a very different social
and religious order from those of the social conservative.
However, it is worth noting in these final paragraphs that the persistence
of the equivalence between Islamic social conservatism and adherence to religious
rules is not only false, it is also positively dangerous in the large part of the world
where the central role of Islam in establishing legal order is rarely questioned.26
So long as Islam retains this position, then there is very clearly a problem with
attributing the preferences of social conservatives to the realization of "strict"
shari'a, while describing those of Muslim liberals as "reformist." The social
conservative is then seen as pure, and unmotivated by any ideological, political or
social concerns beyond those of faithfully fulfilling God's Will. Pursuant to this
vision, it is not that the Minister of Justice,270 or at least the core constituency
whose support he courts, wants fathers to be able to marry their infant daughters
to middle aged men who will "thigh" them.2 7 1 It is that God deems it permissible,
and the Minister can do no more than humbly and piously do His Will.
Yet as we have seen, the Code almost entirely ignores a rather central
part of Shi'i marriage doctrine, and one discussed at some length by jurists across
the span of centuries. This is the "temporary marriage," where one contracts with
a woman to marry her for a short span of time, with the barter being explicitly the
272trade of money, in the form of a dower, for sexual enjoyment2. In the absence of
any set of rules governing the practice in the Draft Ja'fari Code, it would appear to
fall within the definition of prostitution under Iraqi law, a crime that is punishable
269 To give a sense of the considerable popularity of Islam generally, and the shari'a
particularly, as a source of legal order, the Pew Research Center undertook a broad and
extensive survey in 2013 respecting attitudes religion, politics and society in the Muslim
world. The study showed that "[o]verwhelming percentages of Muslims in many countries
want Islamic law (sharia) to be the official law of the land." The World's Muslims:
Religion, Politics and Society, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE (Apr.
30, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-
society-overview/.
270 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing the role of the Minister of
Justice in promulgating the Draft Ja'fari Code).
271 See SISTANI, supra note 51, 3: ¶8; HAKIM, supra note 128, at 14:79-80. See also
supra notes 145-46 accompanying text.
272 See supra Part II.B.
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273by life imprisonment2. In other words, in Iraq today, a woman could go to jail
for life for agreeing to be sexually available to a man for an hour in exchange for a
sum of money, even though the jurists specifically permit this practice. The draft
Code does nothing to change that result.
One could imagine a different result: a libertarian one that imposed life
imprisonment on anyone performing any sort of sexual act with a child, but
legalized a temporary marriage between consenting adults. It is hardly obvious
that, were it ever advocated, it would represent a more radical departure from
juristic rules than the draft Code, which legalizes child marriage and leaves
temporary marriage illegal and subject to harsh punishment. There is no reason to
call one of these approaches "pure" or "literal" while describing the other as
"reformist." To do so would delegitimize the libertarian approach as the
contamination of doctrine while also sanctifying the sociall conservative one as
somehow in close adherence to it. This leaves the content of the shari'a in the
firm grip of social conservatives, and makes meaningful reassessment of the
doctrinal tradition in a more progressive direction all the harder to achieve.
In the end, the debate is hardly about literal adherence to any doctrine, as
nobody is really attempting that. It is instead about ideological preferences. Do
we seek an Islam that recognizes the inherent worth of the individual, grants
individuals the freedom to make their own decisions respecting matters such as
marriage and religion, seeks to protect disadvantaged groups from discrimination,
and permits and protects challenges to existing hierarchies and modalities of
authority? Or do we prefer a preservation of those existing hierarchies and
modalities, so that men control the lives of women, fathers control the lives of
children, tribes control the lives of their members, and each has the duty to obey
those in authority over them? Neither is more literal nor more faithful to any
preexisting doctrine. The doctrine is merely the mask. It is beyond time to rip it
off.
273 Prostitution was punishable by death until 2003, when the death penalty was
suspended and replaced by life imprisonment. Revolutionary Command Council Decree
No. 234 of 2001 (Iraq), at art. 3, http://gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/rcc-resolution-234-of-
2001.pdf as amended by Coalition Provisional Authority Order 7, at art. 3(1) (June 10,
2003).
